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A. Introduction: Motivation and Research Question 
 
 ‘Regional trade agreements, in tandem with multilateral 
liberalization, can also help countries (…) build on their 
comparative advantages, sharpen the efficiency of their industries, 
and act as a springboard to integration into the world economy. 
They can also help focus and strengthen their political commitment 
to an open economy. Regionalism can be a powerful compliment to 
the multilateral system, but it cannot be a substitute. The 
multilateral trading system was created after the Second World 
War precisely to prevent the dominance of rival trading blocks. The 
resurgence of regionalism today risks signalling a failure of global 
economic cooperation and a weakening of support for 
multilateralism. It threatens the primacy of the WTO, and 
foreshadows a world of greater fragmentation, conflict, and 
marginalization.’ 
 
Supachai Panichpakdi, November 26th, 2002.1
 
In the speech delivered by one of the most internationally prominent compatiots 
of mine, one year after the Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) and during the 
preparation of the Cancùn Ministerial by, the then Director General pointed the 
complicate relationship between preferential trade agreements, often termed and 
interchangeably used as regional trade agreements, regional trade arrangements or 
(economic) regionalism, and the WTO multilateral trade regime. Clearly, in the 
perception of its Director General and of many policy makers and academics, the WTO 
has or should have the primacy in shaping international commerce through its quasi-
universally accepted legal rules and as rule-making forum for every member. However, 
the world trade feature in the recent year has been speaking a different language. Not 
only there exists a complex network of preferential trade agreements as subsystems 
coexistent to the WTO multilateral regime. Preferential trade agreements are 
increasingly dominating world trade in terms of trade volume, the preference and 
attention given by countries as promising international trade policy option and 
regardings the setting of new trade topics and norms innovation. Whereas the Doha 
Negotiations have experienced setbacks, preferential trade agreements proliferate 
dynamically and have become a potential threat to the welfare of WTO member 
countries and the the multilateral trade community as a whole. The Article XXIV of the 
                                                 
1 Director General of the World Trade Organisation (2002-2005), speech titled ‘Why Cancún Matters’, 
delivered at the Second International Conference on Globalisation, Leuven, Belgium, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl67_e.htm, retrieved on 1 September 2009.  
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO regulation of preferential trade 
agreements, being drafted in 1947, probably did not foresee such a proliferation, all the 
more it is interesting to question whether nowadays the Article effectively fulfils the 
function of enhancing global welfare by shielding WTO members from possible welfare 
loss and ensuring positive welfare effects of preferential trade agreements on the whole 
WTO trade community. This questions has been answered by means of international 
trade theories and public international law studies. The Article being an (a public 
international legal) institution, it is definitely a law-and-economic question. However… 
 
‘The economic analysis rarely has delved into the origin of (public 
international) legal rules, the interpretation of legal doctrine, or the 
consequences of particular legal regimes. Although there are 
exceptions to this pattern (…), those have not been a large portion 
of writings about international economic activity or relative paucity 
or about international law. The relative paucity of economic 
analysis of international law issues is especially striking when 
compared with the proliferation of law-and-economics writings in 
other legal fields.’ 
 
Ronald A. Cass.2
 
Indeed approaches in law and economics have been applied in many fields: 
contract law, tort law, other branches of civil law, criminal law, constitutional law, 
public administration, criminal and administrative procedure, etc. but not so in public 
international law. The question that arises is, if law and economics can deal in domestic 
context with individuals as rational actors, what are the perspective of and obstacles to 
law and economics application in analysing public international regime. Action patterns 
of rational states, constrained by limited resource, in anarchical structure on 
interantional politics is comparable with economic decisions of rational individuals 
subject to certain constraints, and, indeed, state conduct of international relations can be 
explained with intra-state cost-benefit analysis. Foreign policy decision-making 
necessarily takes into account possible consequences such as repisals, sanctions of 
international community or particular countries, effects on alliances or cooperation, 
legal consequences and, not least, effects on prestige. Particular characteristics of public 
international law may necessitate some changes in the application of law and economics 
                                                 
2 Cass, Ronald A. (1996), Economics and International Law, in Bhandari, Jagdeep S., and Alan O. Sykes 
(ed.), Economic Dimensions of International Law: Comparative and Empirial Perspectives, London: 
Routledge (hereinafter Cass), p. 3. 
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in its analysis. It should, however, not render this efforts impossible, even less in the 
trade-related issues where quantifiable factors are predominant in state decision-making 
such as in the WTO regulation of preferential trade agreements. 
 
Based on the motivations, the main research question of the thesis is whether the 
GATT Article XXIV fulfil its mission of enhancing efficiency to the global world trade 
in which the WTO multilateral trade regime with MFN and PTAs coexists. In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to demonstrate the prospect of economic analysis of 
public international law. 
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B. Methodology and structure of the thesis 
 
The task of the thesis is to discuss the global welfare in the world trade system 
with both the multilateral regime of the WTO and preferential trade agreements between 
the situation with the GATT Article XXIV in place and the situation where the WTO 
regulations do not contain the Article. It is therefore in some ways a comparison of 
welfare situation under different institutions. Although law and economics usually 
involves the task of institution comparison, the situation in which the WTO regulations 
omit the Article does in fact not exist. Consequently, the thesis will explore the channels 
through which preferential trade agreements can adversely affect the global welfare 
situation and subsequently discuss whether the Article has contributed to lifting these 
channels so as to improve the welfare. In other words, the thesis will look at state 
behaviour permitted by the institution: the rules, its interpretation and application, 
whether this lead to an improvement in global trade efficiency compared with when 
states are free to conduct trade policy relating to preferential trade agreements only 
subject to the rest of the WTO rule. 
 
In doing so, the thesis does not intend to present quantitative welfare analysis of 
the institution. Nor will it be able to consider all relating aspects and factors in a 
comprehensive manner. Due to specific characteristics of public international law, 
multitude of actors and their motivation, and the complexity of the WTO rules, this is 
virtually impracticable in the analysis of such a regime. The thesis insteas applies 
heuristic approach to move forward to the solution, whereby significant components 
and elements necessary for the analysis will be presented and discussed with the aim of 
being able to draw a plausible conclusion of the main question. 
 
As regards the procedural method of the thesis, first, Section C will sensibilize 
the readers to the extent of and the role preferential trade agreements play in 
international trade. In order to understand its efficiency, the Article needs to be 
understood. The next section D therefore presents the Article, its place within the WTO 
trade regime, its interpretation and application by the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies, 
as well as its effectiveness from the point of view of public international law. The 
following section  E presents briefly the fundamentals of law and economic and main 
characteristics of public international law, and concludes with the discussion about their 
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implications on the application of law and economics. Section F will fit the WTO and in 
particular the Article into the law and economic framework by discussing the 
components and elements that are necessary in law and economics application in the 
context of the GATT Article. These include transaction costs and elements of state’s 
welfare function. The more detailed section G shows how, through which channels and 
under which circumstances preferential trade agreements affect states and global 
welfare. Section H analyses the findings in section D in connection with those from 
section G, thereby focusing on the law and economics rationale for the provisions in the 
article, state behaviour as consequence of the Article application, the welfare effects of 
the behaviour, as well as rule improving recommendation. The section will ultimately 
answer whether and how the Article indeed fulfils (or not) its efficiency-enhancing role. 
The final section I concludes the thesis by summarizing and linking the findings in all 
the sections.  
 8
C. WTO and preferential trade agreements in 
international economic relations 
 
1. World trade feature 
 
The international economic relation nowadays is characterised by the ever 
growing volume and value of economic transactions, wherein international trade has 
been playing the most important role in terms of economic production factors involved. 
World trade volume has been steadily growing in world history and reached its all-time 
highth in 2008 before the financial and economic crisis in 2009. In 2008, the value of 
world trade in merchandise and services amounted to US$ 34 trillion,3 compared with 
the 2007 world real GDP of US$ 61 trillion.4 The growth rate of international trade 
volume has a strong positive correlation with the world real GDP growth and has 
comparatively been constantly more amplified: in the period between 1950-2007, the 
former increased by 6.2% annually, the latter 3.8%. Not only has the global trade 
volume increased in this period. The structure of world trade in terms of traded objects 
and trading nations has changed. Trade in services increases dramatically in the recent 
decades, unlike trade in agriculture and fuel. In 1953, the two main sources of 
international trade, the European and North American countries accounted for 60% of 
total global mechadise trade volume. By 2006, developing countries notably the so-
called emerging countries not only have a significant shares in world trade: China 9%, 
newly industrialised Asian economies5 9%, Russian Federation 3%, they also account 
for a larger share of industrial goods. Between 1990-2005 their trade volume rose by 
9.3% annually, compare with the global growth rate of trade volume of 5.8%. 
Generally, international trade has become more diversified for each country in terms of 
traded goods and services and in term of trade destinations.6 This unprecedented rise of 
living standard expressed in national income and of global trade volume is accompanied 
by gradual liberalisation of international trade at global level through reciprocal 
                                                 
3 World Trade Organisation (2008), World Trade Report 2008, Geneva: World Trade Organisation 
(hereinafter WTR 08), p. 11. 
4 International Monetary Fund (2007), World Economic Outlook, October 2007: Globalization and 
Inequality, Washington: International Monetary Fund, p. 169. 
5 Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand. 
6 WTR 08, pp. 12-19. 
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reduction of trade barriers and the establishment of fundamental principles to ensure 
more equitable and freer exchange: the establishment of GATT/WTO multilateral trade 
regime. This rise is arguable also spurred by the recent phenomenon of preferential 
trade agreements. 
 
2. WTO multilateralism 
 
Multilateralism is commonly understood as an expression referring to an action 
of groups of international actors, usually states acting in concert. Multilateral global 
governance establishes binding rules and procedures for the action and universally 
accepted global institution to govern the rules and procedures without evolving into a 
world government7 WTO multilateral trade regime involves two main features: the 
principle of non-discrimination between larger and smaller trading nations, which rules 
out the aggressive use of power by the strong to extract concessions from the weak and 
to force the latter to accept unfair rules, and the continuous exchange of reciprocal 
concessions in order to move towards free trade.8 The establishment of the WTO and 
its binding dispute settlement mechanisms are an important step towards global 
economic governance and the main contributor to the current world trade pattern, which 
is characterised by the mutually enforcing increased of trade volume, lower average 
tariff rates and quantitative barriers to trade, and economic development. 
 
Being formally established in 1995, the WTO has its foundation in the GATT, 
and the latter remains the integrating part of the WTO. The GATT negotiations were 
organized in rounds, beginning with the Geneva Round in 1947 with 23 member 
countries. In the last GATT negotiations round prior to the advent of the WTO, the 
Uruguay round, more than 120 countries participated. More and more developing 
countries and countries in economic transition join the WTO.  
 
The WTO is the main venue for tariffs reduction negotiations. Between the 
opening of the first round of multilateral liberalisation in Geneva in 1947 and the 
                                                 
7 Wilkinson, Rorden (2000), Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation, New York: Routledge, 
(hereinafter Wilkinson), pp.32-4. 
8 Bhagwati, Jagdish (1990), Departure from Multilateralism: Regionalism and Aggressive Unilateralism’, 
Economic Journal, 100, p. 1304. 
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closure of the Tokyo round in 1979, the avarage world tariffs declined by nearly 70%.9 
Since the end of the Uruguay round of negotiations (1983-1995), the average tariff rate 
of the largest trading nations accounting for more than 85% of the world trade have 
gradually decline. The average tariff rates for import of non-agricultural and non-fuel 
goods has decreased by more than 60% in the period. The US tariffs, for instance, 
dropped from 5.9% in 1992 to 3.5% in 2006, the EC from 6.8% to 3.9%, Japan from 
3.7% to 2.4%, China from 42.2% to 9.1% and India from 59.1% to 15.3%.  
 
Since Kennedy (1962-67) and Tokyo (1970-1983) round, negotiation have been 
extended to other trade sectors such as agriculture and trade in services, as well as non-
tariff, non-quantitative barriers and other forms of protectionism that government 
continually invented.10 Therefore the GATT and later the WTO multilateral trade 
regime has evolved with the new development of trade issues in the parallel manner, 
such that other trade restrictions and other sectors have gradually been covered, for 
instance, subsidies, the protection of intellectual property, standards and regulations, 
rules of origin, technical barriers to trade, safeguards, trade in services, agriculture, and 
textile. The WTO has been strengthened institutionally compared with the GATT: 
policy review mechanism, consultation procedures, good offices, concilation and 
mediation, arbitration and, most importantly, adjudication by dispute settlement bodies 
(the Panel and the Appellate Body). Further, since the Doha Negotiation round (2001-), 
trade and development issues, such as aid for trade, building trade capacity, trade and 
the least developed countries, have been given a priority. The Doha round also deals 
with new and complex issues such as market access for agriculture, intellectual property 
rights and textile, and have experiences several setbacks due to the controversial natures 
of the issues. 
 
Disappointed by a lack of progress at the GATT/WTO negotiations, many 
countries, both developed and developing countries decided to pay more attention to 
conclude preferential trade agreements. With the gaining dynymic of ‘Regionalism’, 
preferential trade agreement are not just an option of economic diplomacy, but also a 
necessity. Especially with the gradual integration and expansion of the European 
Community, other developed countries, fearing that their access to world market and 
                                                 
9 De Melo, Jaime and Arvind Panagariya (ed.) (1993), New Dimenstions in Regional Integration, 
Princeton, New York: Cambridge University Press (hereinafter De Melo), p. 3 
10 Landau, Alice (2005), The International Trading System, New York: Routledge, pp.11-3. 
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their competitiveness could be threatened, began to turn to preferential trade 
agreements. Developing countries in turn out follow the suite of the same concern. This 
development makes preferential trade agreements one of the, if not ‘the’, determinant 
factor of the world trade.  
 
3. Preferential trade agreements’ extent and role in international 
economy 
 
The more ‘popular’ term ‘regional trade agreement’ is interchangeably used 
instead of ‘preferential trade agreement’, which can be defined as ‘an agreement under 
which partner economies impose lower tariffs and other trade restrictions on import 
from each other than on import from the outside world.’11 As in the WTO context, the 
former may be agreements concluded between countries not necessarily belonging to 
the same geographical region, the latter term will be used in this thesis. A preferential 
trade agreement that foresees the elimination of tariffs and other trade restrictions 
among members can be called free-trade area. A free-trade area whose members impose 
common tariff rates and trade restrictive measures on import from third countries is 
called customs union. The feature of further economic integration (single market and 
economic union) are similar to customs union regarding their trade policy towards third 
countries and thus likewise customs union in the WTO context.  
 
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995, the number of preferential trade 
agreements has dramatically increased, especially in the last few years. As of November 
2009, there were 263 preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO and in force, 
most of them agreements on trades in goods.12 Some regions are particularly actively 
in involving in negotiating new agreements. With the exception of Mongolia, all other 
WTO members are party to at least one preferential trade agreement.13 The spread of 
preferential trade agreements is a long progress parallel to multilateral negotiations. The 
first wave of preferential trade agreement proliferation came during the early 1960s in 
Europe with the European Common Market and also in Africa and Latin America. The 
                                                 
11 De Melo, p. 160. 
12 WTO database, Internet: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx, retrieved on 1 November 
2009. 
13 World Trade Organisation (2007), World Trade Report 2007, Geneva: World Trade Organisation 
(hereinafter WTR 07), p. 304. 
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first wave was interrupted during the economic crises in the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
and was followed by the second wave led by the United States (Norther American Free 
Trade Area - NAFTA), European Community (EC), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
South America (MERCOSUR) and several other cross-regional bilateral preferential 
trade agreement.14 The first south-south and north-south preferential trade agreements 
emerges in this period.15 Following the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the increase 
of China’s economic power, the third wave of preferential trade agreement proliferation 
can be observed in Asia-Pacific region16, where the countries until today remain the 
most active in concluding preferential trade agreement. Facing the slow progress made 
in the Doha round, many developing countries have opted to open up for bilateral trade 
agreement among themselves and with developed countries, increasingly cross-regional. 
The existing preferential trade agreements have experienced a consolidation in terms of 
deepening integration.17
 
Nowadays, the European Economic Area consisting of EC members and 
Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein is globally the largest customs union in terms of 
trade volume. There are also many free-trade agreements between the EC and Eastern 
European and Mediterranean nations. In the western Hemisphere, the NAFTA (Canada, 
the US and Mexico), MERCOSUR (Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Venezuela) and the Andean Community (Peru, Bolivia, Columbia and Ecuador) 
dominates the trade volume, while some countries, such as Chile, Mexico, Peru, are 
particularly active in entering into free trade agreements with other extra-regional 
countries. In East Asia and Pacific region, all countries in the region engage in at least 
one negotiation, either as member of a regional trade agreement like AFTA or as 
individual country, the most active being South Korea, Japan, China, Singapore, 
Australia and Thailand. The East Asian Economic Community comprising of AFTA, 
Japan, South Korea and China, once realized, would become one of the largest custums 
union worldwide. South Asian countries are implementing the South Asian Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA), and its driving force, India and Pakistan, started bilateral and 
                                                 
14 De Melo, p.5. 
15 Fiorentino, Robert V. et al. (2006), Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 
Updates, Geneva: World Trade Organisation (hereinafter Fiorentino), p. 2. 
16, Richard (2006), Is Regionalism an Increasing Feature of the World Economy?, IIIS Discussion paper 
164, pp. 2-4. Internet: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925802, retrieved in 13 August 
2009.
17 Fiorentino, p. 6-10 
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plurilateral preferential trade negotiations with mainly Asian countries but also with 
MERCOSUR and the EC. In North Africa and the Middle East, the customs union of 
the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) is one of the most dynamic preferential trade areas 
worldwide, and the driving force of the pan-Arab Free Trade Area which includes all 
Arabic nations except  Algeria. With the few exceptions of non-reciprocal preferential  
trade agreements with the EC, trade agreements of African countries are mostly based 
on geographical proximity. They are trade blocs forming the pillars of the African 
Economic Community with the goal of ever closer pan-African economic integration 
forms. Despite being the least active among the regions, the Central Asian countries are 
engaged in  preferential liberalisation through other plurateral initiatives, without 
forming region’s own free-trade area.18
 
The share of trade among preferential trade agreement members in the world 
trade has become larger along with their proliferation. Whereas the fugure was 
approximately 35-40% during the first wave of preferential trade agreements, it grew to 
55-60% immediately before the Asian financial crisis.19 According to Crawford, the 
intra-preferential trade agreement trade accounted for almost 90% of the total world 
trade in 2005.20 While the share of the Intra-regional trade in total foreign trade of two 
most industrialized preferential trade areas, NAFTA and the European Community, 
remain relatively stable in the last 10 years, it is not the case in emerging economies and 
developing countries which only recently have acceded to preferential trade 
agreements.21 That is probably due to the fact that the trade-stimulating effect of a 
preferential trade agreement tends to be higher between trading members having 
relatively high tariff rates and restrictions, which is the case for trade between or with 
developing countries. 
 
Not only have preferential trade agreements increased in number, proliferated 
geographically at a more speedy pace and accounted for a larger proportion of world 
trade, they also include increasingly diverse areas of trade. While the first wave of 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 14-19. 
19 Schiff, Maurice, and Alan L. Winters (1998), Dynamics and Politics in Regional Integration 
Arrangements: An Introduction, World Bank Economic Review, 12 (2), p. 178. 
20 Fiorentino, p. 2. 
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development et al. (2007), Trade and Development Report 
2007: Regional Cooperation of Development, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, p. 84. 
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preferential trade agreements dealt with tariff concessions and market access for goods, 
the later preferential trade agreements deal also with a large range of topics such as 
trade in services, harmonisation of domestic regulations, common standards (notbaly 
labour and environment standards), dispute settlement mechanisms, and building of 
common institutions that match deeper economic integration.22 The increase in the 
number of preferential trade agreements and in the institutional and thematic dimension 
have led to the phenomenon of overlapping memberships and confusion resulting from 
unregulated scope of application. Different trade rules applying to parties to different 
agreements has become frequent. The scope of preferential agreements may broaden to 
include those not regulated multilaterally, and the provision under preferential 
agreements could be inconsistent with multilateral rules or other preferential 
agreements.23 This has led to confusion and implementation problems and to the 
question whether preferential trade agreements lead to fairer and freer world trade, and 
thus the adequacy of WTO regulations of preferential trade agreements: the questions 
that the thesis will also try to elaborate. 
                                                 
22 De Melo, p. 17. 
23 WTO Website, Internet: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm, retrieved on 
26 July 2009. 
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D. WTO and preferential trade agreements: the 
regulating regime and its effectiveness 
 
This relatively descriptive part of the thesis presents some legal aspects of the 
WTO regime, in particular the GATT Article XXIV, that are significant to the economic 
analysis of the article. It serves three important purposes. First, it should raise the legal 
understanding of the Article by introducing its rules and interpretation, and thus serving 
as the basic of its own analysis. Second, it presents in the final part a brief answer to the 
question whether the Article contributes effectively to upholding WTO fundamental 
principles – a question similar to the main research question, answered from the 
international law point of view. And third, some findings in this part have a direct 
implication on the economic analysis of the article later in section H. 
 
1. WTO multilateral trade regime and the GATT Article XXIV 
 
Since its formal establishment in 1995, the World Trade Organisation has been 
the only international organisation that deals with international trade in the most 
extensive and intensive way. The WTO was developed from the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-
1994). Whereas the previous round had concentrated on negotiation on commercial 
concessions, the Uruguay Round witnessed negotiations on broader scope of trade 
including services, agriculture and intellectual property rights, and, put forward by 
Canada in 1990,24 the more fundamental issue of trade rules: a formal organisation to 
effectively ‘govern’ the conduct of world trade by providing institution that would not 
only incorporate and build on the GATT25 but also include other agreements not 
dealing with trade in goods which had been regulated by the GATT 1947 to be 
negotiated in the future. The Uruguay Round negotiations culminated in the Marrakech 
Declaration in which the GATT members expressed their intention to establish the 
WTO, and in the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the ‘constitution’ of the WTO. 
Beyond the development in institutional arrangements, central to the evolution was the 
                                                 
24 Finger, J. Michael (1991), That Old GATT Magic No More Casts Its Spell, Journal of World Trade, 
p.22 
25 Wilkinson, p.29. 
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set of multilateral trade principles. These core principles originally enshrined in GATT 
have been embodied in the WTO agreements. 
 
In order to understand the importance and the place of the GATT Article XXIV 
within the WTO trade regime, it is necessary to be acquainted with the structure of 
WTO agreements. The ‘umbrella’ or ‘core’ of the WTO mulitlateralism is the 
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the WTO (1994), henceforth the WTO Treaty. 
The WTO treaty contains in its annexes a set of specific agreements regulating trade in 
different areas as follows: 
 
- Annex 1 consists of 3 agreements: Annex 1(a) General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (henceforth GATT 1994); Annex 1(b) General 
Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS); and Annex 1(c) Agreements on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
- Annex 2 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
- Annex 3 Trade Review Policy Mechanims 
- Annex 4 plurilateral Trade Agreements consist of 4 agreements: Annex 4(a) 
Agreement in Trade in Civil Aircraft; Annex 4(b) Agreement on 
Government procurement; Annex 4(c) International Dairy Agreement; and 
Annex 4(d) International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
 
While agreements in Annex 4 are of plurilateral nature, agreements in Annexes 
1-3 are binding to all WTO members.26 The GATT 1994, being legally distinct from 
the GATT 1947, which had served as the basic multilateral trade rule prior to the 
establishment of the WTO,27 consists not only of all provisions of its predecessor, the 
GATT 1947, and all legal instruments that had entried into force under the GATT 1947 
until the date of the establishment of the GATT 1994, but also of the Understandings on 
several issues related to GATT 1947 and the Marrakech Declaration on the GATT 
1994.28 GATT 1947 is the substantive rule of GATT 1994, and this is where the GATT 
Article XXIV can be found. Although the article has been formulated for GATT 1947, 
remains unchanged ever since and was incorporated into GATT 1994 as part of GATT 
                                                 
26 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter WTO Treaty), Article II:2 and 3. 
Internet: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf, retrieved on 25 August 2009. 
27 Article II:4 of WTO Treaty. 
28 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT 1994), Paragraph 1 
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1947, the WTO documents legally correctly refer to the article as Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1994, as GATT 1994 is the document in force and legally distinct from GATT 
1947. Considering the interpretation and application of the GATT Article XXIV, 
another important legal instrument plays the central role: the document called ‘the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994’. The 
Understanding bolsteres the original interpretation and application of the Article beyond 
what it had been. The instrument will be therefore also taken into account in the 
analysis of the Article. 
 
2. The the objectives of the WTO and Most Favoured Nation as 
the core principles of the GATT 1994 
 
Understanding the objectives and the main principles of the WTO is very 
essential for the interpretation and application of Article XXIV, and thus to its appraisal, 
not only because the article provides for exception to the MFN principle, but also 
because answering the question as whether Article XXIV effectively regulates 
preferential trade agreements such that the latter comply with the WTO multilateral 
trade regime prerequisites the thorough appreciation of objectives, purposes and other 
main principles of the WTO. 
 
As an international treaty, the ‘umbrella’ treaty of the WTO, the WTO treaty 
stipulates the objectives of the WTO in its preambular paragraphs. Like the principles 
and institutions of the WTO multilateral trade regime originated from the GATT 1947, 
the preambular paragraphs of the WTO treaty are developed from the preambular 
paragraphs of the GATT 1947. The objectives of the WTO are raising standard of living 
and ensuring sustainable economic development with steady income, employment, 
demand and production growth through ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangments directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’.29 In 
pursuing these objectives, the core WTO principles were formulated and have been 
applied since the formation of the GATT 1994 and included in the GATT 1994 as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
29 Preamble of the WTO Treaty 
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- Most Favoured Nation  principle (MFN) aims at non-discrimination between 
trading partners; 
- National Treatment principle (NT) aims at non-discriminate treatment 
between national and foreign like-products; 
- Gradual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers; 
- Predictability and transparence of national trade policy through clear and 
binding commitment to eliminate trade barriers; 
- Encouragement and enhancement of economic development in developing 
countries.30  
 
A special attention is paid on MFN, as a formation of a preferential trade 
agreement constitutes a clear violation of the principle. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 
reads  
 
‘With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed 
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on 
the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with 
importation and exportation, (…) any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.’31
 
MFN is defined both as positive and negative commitment, in the sense that all 
advantages, favours and privileges, but also restrictive practices are to be accorded to all 
unconditionally and without restriction.32 Clearly, the benefits countries expect from 
the MFN stems not merely from ‘equality’, that is equally good or bad treatment,33 but 
more importantly the gradual erosion of trade barriers. The virtue and backdrops of 
MFN shall be later elaborated in this thesis in connection with the economic analysis of 
Article XXIV. 
 
                                                 
30 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm, retrived on September 28th, 2009. 
31 Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 
32 Wilkinson, p.46. 
33 Viner, Jacob (1951), International Economics, London: George, Allen and Unwin, p.100. 
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3. Article XXIV: rules, interpretation and application 
 
The Article provisions reflect the desire to ensure coherent application of WTO 
and preferential trade agreements and progressively more open and fair world trading 
system through rule-based proliferation of preferential trade agreements. However at the 
same time, since customs unions and free trade areas have a long history before the 
constitution of WTO or even of the GATT 1947, many countries, mostly developed 
countries and former colonial powers at that time who had been since the sixteenth 
century familiar with their own pre-GATT commercial treaties providing for trade 
preferences34, were less willing to deprive themselves of the freedom of forming 
preferential trade agreements. Little negotiation history of the Article been recorded.35 
The Article was in 1945 proposed by the United States36 and gained wide support also 
from developing countries, who considered especially free trade areas as promising 
option of the future37 and well-suited to countries with limited resources.38 Without 
the intention to prevent the proliferation of preferential trade agreements, The GATT 
provides for regulations and criteria that allow its members to exercise their sovereign 
rights to accede to or create preferential trade agreements in accordance with principles 
and rules upheld by the WTO39. The concept of the Article is therefore not to prohibit 
preferential trade agreements altogether, as it ‘recognize(s) the desirability of increasing 
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer 
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements,’ but 
rather stipulate that the purpose of a preferential trade agreement, be it customs union or 
a free trade area, ‘should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not 
to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.’40
 
                                                 
34 Herzstein, Robert E., and Joseph P. Whitlock (2005), Regulating Regional Trade Agreements – a Legal 
Analysis, in Macrory, Patrick F. J., the WTO: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, New York. 
Spinger, p. 220. (henceforth Herzstein) 
35 Ibid., p. 222. 
36 Mathis, James (2002), Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO, p. 33. 
37 Ibid, p. 34. 
38 World Trade Organisation (1995), Regionalism and the World Trade System, p. 29-35. (hereinafter 
Regionalism and the World Trade System) 
39 Koul, Autar, Krishen (2005), Guide to the WTO and GATT, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
(hereinafter Koul), p. 328. 
40 Article XXIV:4 of the GATT 1994 
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3.1 WTO conformity of preferential trade agreements: Article XXIV: 5 
and 8 
 
The objective of Article XXIV is to guarantee that the design and 
implementation of preferential trade agreements are compatible with the objective and 
purpose of the WTO and its principles. It should also any possible minimize welfare 
loss to third parties as well as parties to preferential trade agreements, and avoid 
complication in the application of preferential trade agreements and WTO rules.41 For 
the WTO conformity, it is necessary though that a preferential trade agreement satisfies 
two most significant criteria in Article XXIV: the qualification as genuine preferential 
trade agreements according to Article XXIV: 8, the so-called ‘substantially all’ 
criterion, and the absence of an adverse effect on other WTO members according to 
Article XXIV: 5, the so-called ‘on the whole not higher’ criterion. In the case that an 
adverse effect on third parties pursuant to the establishment of a RTA, particularly a 
customs union, cannot be avoid, its members have an obligation to compensate under 
Article XXIV: 6 to restore the observance of Article XXIV: 5. For WTO rule 
conformity, a preferential trade agreement must also comply withArticle XXIV:7.42 It 
is therefore of great important to look at the provision of these articles. 
 
Internal trade requirement: Article XXIV:8 
 
Article XXIV: 8 reads 
‘For the purpose of this Agreement: 
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a 
single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that  
 
(a) (i) Duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Article XI, XII, XIII, XIV, 
XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with 
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories, and, 
 (ii) Subject to the provision of paragraph 9, substantially the 
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each 
                                                 
41 Preambles of the Understandings on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 (hereinafter 
the Understanding).  
42 Paragraph 1 of the Understandting reads ‘Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements 
leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must 
satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.’ 
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of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included 
in the union; 
 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or 
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Article XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories.’ 
 
To begin with, Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) requires that members of a customs union 
eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations. The main challenge here is that WTO 
members cannot agree on the meaning of the terms ‘substantially all the trade’ and 
‘other restrictive regulations’. Although, article 3.2 of the DSU tries to facilitate the 
interpretation by stating that any interpretation has to be in conformity with the rule of 
interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties43, institutions of neither the GATT nor WTO could provide a clear legal 
definition for the terms.44 Obviously, Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) tries to set the level of 
integration as qualification for a preferential trade agreement and as criterion for 
permission to depart from MFN obligations (with ‘substantially all’) and give the 
answer to the question as to what kind of restrictions is permitted among parties to 
preferential trade agreement (with ‘other restrictive regulations’).45 With regards to the 
first term, the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textile case, agreeing with the Panel, rules 
that ‘substantially all’ offers some flexibility to constituent members of a customs union 
with regards to the degree of liberalisation, stating that ‘substantially all trade’ is not 
equal to all trade and considerably more than ‘some’ trade.46 This flexibility is, 
however, limited by the requirement that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations’ be 
eliminated, with exceptions, if necessary, of measure under Article XI through XV and 
                                                 
43 Article 31 of the VCTL obliges the interpreter to examine the ordinary meaning of the terms, the 
meaning in their context, in the light of purpose and objects, taking into account any subsequent decision 
and subsequent practice. 
44 Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis (2003), The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, New York: Oxford University Press (henceforth Matsushita et 
al), p.356 
45 Trachtman, Joel, P. (2007), ‘International Trade: Regionalism’, in Guzman, Andrew, T. and Alan O. 
Sykes (eds), Research Handbook in International Economic Law, Cheltenhem: Edward Elgar (hereinafter 
Trachtman), p.162. 
46 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, 
WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999 (henceforth Appellate Body, Turkey – Textile), paragraph 
48. 
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Article XX of the GATT 1994.47 Considering the term ‘other restrictive regulations of 
commerce’, it is not clear what kind of regulations Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) prohibits or 
allows. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body in Argentina – Footwear (European 
Community) case has established parallelism between the scope of investigation leading 
to restrictive measures and the application of such measures as additional requirement 
of ‘other restrictive regulations’ to be compatible with Article XXIV. In that case, the 
Appellate Body considered that Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) generally does not prohibit the 
imposition of safeguard measures on other customs union members, in that particular 
case the MERCOSUR, but Argentina must impose the measures on all MERCOSUR 
countries, as its investigation evaluated ‘serious injuries or the threat thereof’ from all 
MERCOSUR sources.48
 
Article XXIV: 8(a)(ii) requires each constituent member of a customs union to 
apply not the identical but substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce with respect to trade with third countries. The expression ‘substantially the 
same’ encompasses both quantitative and qualitative elements of trade restrictions. 
While the quantitative aspect of trade restrictions implies an identical external tariff 
rates, comparable trade regulations having similar effects with respect to trade with 
third countries, and not necessarily identical regulations, would generally meet the 
qualitative requirement of this subparagraph. However, the flexibility is limited as 
something closely approximating ‘sameness’ is definitely required.49
 
Regarding free-trade areas (FTAs), the internal trade standard, the elimination of 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all trade between 
constituent members set out in Article XXIV: 8(b) is almost the same as XXIV: 8(a)(i). 
Therefore, relevant case law and observations concerning the terms ‘substantially all’ 
and ‘other restrictive regulations’ are valid also for FTAs. Article XXIV: 8(b) does not 
contain the elimination of restriction with respect to trade between constituent members 
and non-member but trade in products originating from constituent members 
themselves.  
                                                 
47 Bossche, Peter, van den (2005), The Law of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 654. 
48 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, 
adopted 12 January 2000, paragraph 113. 
49 Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 
adopted as modified on appeal, 19 November 1999, paragraph 9.148; Turkey – Textile, paragraph 50.  
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 External trade requirement: Article XXIV:5 
 
Beside the provisions in Article XXIV: 8, preferential trade agreements have to 
satisfied the external trade requirement contained in Article XXIV: 5, which reads 
 
‘Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, 
as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim 
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or a free-
trade area; provided that: 
 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement 
leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other 
regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such 
union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting 
parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the 
whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of 
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the 
adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be; 
 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement 
leading to a formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other 
regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent 
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or 
the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting 
parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement 
shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties 
and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim 
agreement as the case may be: 
 
(c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
shall include a plan schedule for the formation of such a customs 
union or such a free-trade area with a reasonable length of time.’ 
 
The main message of this Article is that a preferential trade agreement on the 
whole shall not create additional burden to trade with third parties compared with the 
general incidence prior to its application. For the coherence, this ‘external requirement’ 
should be discussed first in connection with FTAs. In addition to Article XXIV: 8(b), a 
member of a FTA must satisfy the requirement of Article XXIV: 5(b) that the duties and 
other regulations of trade with third parties must not be higher or more restrictive than 
before the formation of the FTA. As a FTA involves alterations of trade regulations 
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between parties of the FTA and there is no such creation of a common external tariffs 
that the trade regulations between each FTA member and third parties have to be 
harmonized, the duties and regulations as applied to third parties by each member 
should obviously remain unchanged. It is easy to prove the compliance with Article 
XXIV: 5(b). 
 
For customs unions, the criterion ‘on the whole not higher’ encompasses two 
obligations: the obligation on the whole not to increase barrier to trade between 
members of customs union and third parties after the formation or expansion of the 
customs union (Article XXIV: 5(a)); in other words, duties must not be higher and other 
regulations must not be more restrictive50, and the obligation to provide compensation 
in case that the additional burden to trade for third parties cannot be avoided, such that 
on the whole the trade barrier is not higher following the establishment of the customs 
union (Article XXIV: 6), the observance of Article XXIV: 5(a) is thus restored. The 
criterion ‘on the whole not higher’ is of a great importance, as a creation of a customs 
union necessitates a harmonization of external trade regulations, such that each member 
of the customs union applies ‘substantially the same’ external trade regulations (Article 
XXIV: 8(a)(ii)). A creation of a customs union makes additional trade measures 
inevitable. It is likely that the harmonization or the introduction of additional trade 
measures in some countries lead to higher duties or more restricted regulations with 
respect to trade between these countries and third parties. The qualifications of customs 
unions outlined in Articles XXIV: 5(a) and 6 prevent adverse effects of customs unions 
on third parties. 
 
With respect to Article XXIV: 5(a), the term ‘general incidence’, a benchmark 
for the economic test of the extent of trade restrictions before and after the formation of 
the customs union, needs clarification. The Understandings on Article XXIV of GATT 
clarifies that the evaluation of the general incidence of the duties shall be based upon an 
overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of custom duties collected, and 
that the applied rate of duties, and not bound rate, must be used. The Understanding 
recognizes the difficulties in the evaluation of the general incidence of other regulations 
                                                 
50 Turkey – Textile, paragraph 54. 
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of commerce, and that the examination of individual measures, regulations, products 
covered and trade flows may be required.51
 
Besides the quantification difficulties, the term ‘other regulations of commerce’ 
poses the question as to which ‘other regulations of commerce’ of custom unions are 
permissible under Article XXIV, i.e. whether Article XXIV allows only exceptions to 
MFN provisions or also other GATT provisions, and under which conditions. The 
jurisdiction of the Appellate Body in case Turkey – Textile offers some answers to this 
issue. Quantitative restrictions on textile and clothing products were imposed following 
the creation of the customs union between Turkey and the European Community in 
order to prevent trade diversion, since textile products could flow into the EC through 
Turkey. India brought the case to the WTO dispute settlement bodies arguing that such 
restrictions violated Article XXIV: 5. Firstly, the Appellate Body holds that Article 
XXIV: 4 and the preamble of the Understandings, which reaffirm that the purpose of a 
customs union is to facilitate trade between the constituent members and not to raise 
barriers to the trade with third parties, and that the former should to the greatest extent 
avoid creating adverse effect on the latter, set pervasive purpose for the whole Article 
XXIV.52 Taking into account the chapeau of Article XXIV: 5, the Appellate Body 
finds that the provisions of GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a 
customs union, and that Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify measures 
inconsistent with other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a defence to a finding 
of inconsistency.53 Therefore, under certain conditions, all ‘other regulations of 
commerce’ are allowed under Article XXIV. These conditions are that, first, the 
introduction of such GATT-inconsistent measures, including ‘other regulations of 
commerce’ thus included, takes place upon the formation of a custom union that 
satisfies Article XXIV: 8(a), and, second,  the formation of such a custom union would 
be prevented if these measures are not introduced (necessity criterion).54 The proof of 
the necessity of inconsistent measures involves the proof whether less trade-restrictive 
alternatives to these measures exist. Article XXIV does not serve as defence for 
measures to which less trade-restrictive alternatives are available. In case Turkey – 
Textile, the Appellate Body states that rules of origin to distinguish between Turkish 
                                                 
51 Paragraph 2 of the Understanding. 
52 Turkey – Textile, paragraphs 55-6. 
53 Ibid., paragraph 57. 
54 Ibid., paragraphs 58-9. 
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and third country textile constitute a less trade-restrictive alternative to quantitative 
restrictions, and would have also addressed the concern of trade diversion. While the 
Appellate Body stresses that Turkey’s quantitative restrictions cannot be justified by 
Article XXIV, it does not prohibit quantitative restrictions in general with regards to 
Article XXIV: 5(a).55 As there is no qualification of rules of origin as ‘other restrictive 
regulations’ to be eliminated according to Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) in order for a 
preferential trade agreement to be qualified as customs union, the preferential trade 
agreement between EC and Turkey would also satisfy Article XXIV: 8(a) and become a 
custom union, though not the one that would not require border controls on good and 
consistent with the EC principle of ‘free circulation’.56 In sum, states forming a 
customs union are permitted upon the creation of such a customs union to introduce 
‘other regulations of commerce’ with respect to trade with third parties otherwise 
prohibited by another GATT provision, provided that these measures are necessary for 
the creation of customs union and do not exceed the minimum standards set forth in 
Article XXIV, and there is no less trade-restrictive alternative. 
 
Given that ‘other regulations’ with respect to Article XXIV: 5(a) introduced 
upon the creation of a customs union are justified by the aforementioned approach of 
the Appellate Body, these regulations along with the customs union duties rates will 
undergo the economic test provided for in paragraph 2 of the Understandings. This test 
finally answers whether the customs union satisfied the external trade requirement (‘on 
the whole not higher’ criterion) of Article XXIV: 5. 
  
With regards to Article XXIV: 5(c), the GATT recognizes that customs union or 
free trade areas cannot come into being overnight and do need period of adjustment and 
transitions.57 The vague requirement of ‘within a reasonable length of time’ is clarified 
by the Understandings that this should not exceed ten years except in exceptional 
circumstances. In that case, members of an interim agreements shall provide an 
explanation to the Council for Trade on Goods.58
 
                                                 
55 Ibid., paragraph 65. 
56 Trachtman, p.165-6. 
57 Jackson, John H. (2000), The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 103-4. 
58 Paragraph 3 of the Understandings. 
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3.2 Compensatory adjustments: Article XXIV:6 
 
Article XXIV:6 reads  
 
‘If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5 (a), a 
contracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty 
inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set 
forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory 
adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already 
afforded by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty 
of the other constituents of the union.’ 
 
If, for instance, in the formation of a customs union a constituent member must 
increase a bound duty, because the customs union duty is higher than the bound duty 
applicable before the formation, Article XXIV: 6, lex specialis to Article XXIV: 5(a), 
applies in order to fulfil the Article XXIV: 5 ‘on the whole not higher’ by providing for 
compensatory adjustments. Article XXIV: 6 establishes that the negotiation procedure 
according to the GATT Article XXVIII to be followed when upon the formation of a 
customs union a member of the customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of 
duty. The Understanding further elaborates that the negotiations should lead to mutually 
satisfactory compensatory adjustment, taking into account also the reductions of duties 
on the same tariff lines conceded by other constituents of the customs union. If the 
reductions are not enough to offer compensatory adjustment, reductions of duties on 
other tariff lines should be offered, and negotiations should be continued, if the 
adjustment are still unacceptable. In case that agreement in negotiations on 
compensatory adjustment cannot be reached, the customs union is free to modify or 
withdraw the concessions made, while members who are affected can also withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII. Those third 
party members who benefit from the reduction of duties upon the formation of a 
customs union are not obliged to provide compensation to the members of the customs 
union.59
 
3.3 Notification, examination procedure and review 
 
Article XXIV: 7(a) requires WTO members to notify the establishment of a 
preferential trade agreement or an interim agreement leading to a preferential trade 
                                                 
59 Paragraphs 4-6 of the Understandings. 
 28
agreement to WTO contracting parties. The Understandings state that all notification 
made under this subparagraph shall be examined by a working party in the light of the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1994.  Following the notification, the Council for Trade in 
Goods (CTG) issues a mandate for examination for the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA), where parties to the preferential trade agreement answer questions 
posed by other WTO members orally or in writing. Once the CRTA examination 
process is finished, the WTO Secretariat drafts a report based on issues covered the 
examination and submit it to members of the CTG, which will have to adopt the report 
by consensus in order to complete the examination process. With respect to interim 
agreements, the working party may make recommendations on proposed time-frame 
and measures required to complete the formation of preferential trade agreements.60 If 
a interim agreement does not include a plan and schedule in accordance with Article 
XXIV: 5(c), the working party shall also recommend a plan and schedule. Unless the 
parties to an interim agreement modify or adopt the agreement in accordance with these 
recommendations, the interim agreement cannot be put into force.61  
 
All preferential trade agreement are under an obligation to report periodically to 
the Council for Trade in Goods. Any significant change and/or development in 
preferential trade agreements as well as any substantial change in the plan or schedule 
of an interim agreement shall be notified also to the CTG.62  
 
Article XXIV: 7 obliges a notification but does not require WTO members to 
wait for an advance approval to form or join a preferential trade agreement. WTO 
members are free to form or join a preferential trade agreement if they satisfy the 
procedural and substantial requirements of Article XXIV. In reality, however, most of 
the agreements have been notified after their establishment, because they entered into 
force before the establishment of the WTO. The CTG, its working parties and the 
CRTA commonly have been presented with a fait accompli. Their notification and 
reviews in many cases become an ex post procedure. 
 
                                                 
60 Paragraphs 7-8 of the Understandings. 
61 Article XXIV: 7(b) and paragraph 10 of the Understandings. 
62 Article XXIV: 7(c) and paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Understandings. 
 29
3.4 Observance of Article XXIV by WTO Dispute Settlement Body: 
another regulation of preferential trade agreements 
 
The main bodies responsible for the control of the observance of Article XXIV 
are WTO dispute settlement bodies. The paragraph 12 of the Understandings 
specifically authorizes dispute settlement with respect to any matters arising from the 
application of Article XXIV.63 Although the power of WTO adjudicating bodies 
extend only to matter arising from the application of Article XXIV and not the article as 
such, the application of Article XXIV can cover any matter that comes within the ambit 
of the Article. The broad wordings signals the willingness of WTO members to affirm 
their intention that WTO deals with issues related to preferential trade agreements.64 
The authority of the WTO dispute settlement bodies to evaluate compliance of 
preferential trade agreements with article has been asserted and emphasized in 
jurisdictions of the dispute settlement bodies. Concerning federal states, Article XXIV: 
12 and paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Understandings obliges WTO members to ensure 
the observance of the provisions of the Article by their regional and local authorities. 
Article XXII and XXIII can likewise be invoked for the regional or local measures 
affecting the observance of Article XXIV.65 Article XXIV does not question or 
invalidate an existing preferential trade agreement, nor is it likely that Article XXIV 
shapes the complete design of future preferential trade agreements a priori. Still, it 
should be stressed that there is no protection for pre-existing agreements from scrutiny 
in WTO dispute settlement mechanism. They can possibly be challenge under Article 
XXIV. The Case Turkey – Textile shows that preferential trade agreements are 
potentially subject to rather strict scrutiny.66
 
To support and improve the observance of the Article, the General Council 
mandated The CRTA to define the scope of the existing obligations for preferential 
trade agreements and to report to the General Council on the agreements’ 
implementation of the obligation under Article XXIV and the measures to reinforce 
                                                 
63 paragraph 12 of the Understanding reads ‘The provisions of Article XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as 
elaborated and applied by the DSU may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the 
application of those provisions of Articla XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim 
agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area’ 
64 Matsushita et al, p. 365. 
65 Article XXIV: 12; paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Understandings 
66 Trachtman, p. 169., 
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their complementarity with multilateralism.67 As mentioned earlier, a preferential trade 
agreement review by CRTA becomes an ex post review. Consequently, some WTO-
incompatible provisions of notified preferential trade agreements are unlikely to be 
sanctioned by the CRTA, as this decides by consensus. 
 
4. Effectiveness of Article XXIV from public international law 
perspective 
 
The evaluation of the Article with regards to its effectiveness as WTO legal 
disciplines in governing preferential trade agreements can be difficult from the 
perspective of public international law due to the fact that the legal interrelationship 
between WTO agreements and preferential trade agreements as international treaties is 
far from clear. Nevertheless, several international lawyers appraise the effectiveness of 
the Article by taking as evaluation benchmark the objectives and purposes of the WTO, 
the GATT 1994 and the Article itself. 
 
Generally, the backdrops of the article originate from the legal provisions 
concerning the conditions imposed on preferential trade agreements and, more 
significantly, concerning the procedural matters including notification and examination 
of preferential trade agreements. 
 
Regarding the first aspect some of the legal disciplines set in the Article are 
widely regarded as imprecise and vague inspite of the extensive clarification made by 
the Understanding and the relevant WTO jurisprudence,68 and thus making the Article 
fail to regulate the current proliferation of preferential trade agreements in an effective 
manner.69  
 
To begin with, the key Article XXIV:8, which obliges preferential trade 
agreements to include substantially all trade, experiences a difference interpretation 
with regards to its significance. While some WTO members take quantitative approach, 
arguing that the obligation requires only that a certain percentage of trade volume be 
covered by a preferential trade agreement, other WTO members insist on a qualitative 
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approach, arguing that it requires that no major sector be excluded from coverage of 
preferential trade agreement, as the rules should be aimed at filtering preferential trade 
agreement that were formed with the intent to create sectorally discriminatory 
arrangements – the sectoral coverage should be the benchmark for screening a 
preferential trade agreement.70 The former group of members usually object to 
preferential trade agreements that exclude agriculture fron their coverage.71 Moreover, 
the Article XXIV:8 provision regarding ‘other restrictive measures’ can be detrimental 
to WTO objectives. An example of rules of origin provides an evidence: FTAs in 
absence of a common external tariffs necessarily apply rules of origin, as non-FTA 
exporters might have incentives to export goods through the member with lowest tariff 
rates and then transfer the goods to higher tariff members (trade deflection). The rules 
of origin may specify that non-FTA goods must undergo a substantial transformation 
process within the region in order to be qualified for regional preference. The rules may 
require that non-FTA input shall not account for more than a certain threshold of a 
production costs of a good in order for this good to be qualified as originated in the 
FTA. Alternatively, the rules may require some specific process be undertaken within 
the region. Although the rules of origin clearly can be more restrictive than necessary to 
counter trade deflection and thus constitute internal discrimination, there is no 
clarification as whether rules of origin can be disciplined by Article XXIV: 8 as other 
restrictive measures. WTO is working toward harmonizing and disciplining MFN rules 
of origin, however not preferential trade agreement rules of origin.72 Without 
clarification of the issue of ‘other restrictive measures, protectionist measures against 
other FTA members remain possible. Concerning Article XXIV:5, the requirement of a 
‘reasonable’ transition period for interim agreements to free trade agreement or custums 
union in Article XXIV:5(c) needs clarification in the point of what constitutes 
‘exceptional cases’ for an interim agreement to justify the extention of the ten-year 
period allowed by the Undertanding.73
 
With regards to the procedural matters, notification regime is less efficient and 
contains little incentives for compliance. Given a great number of existing but 
unnotified preferential trade agreements, having no clear provisions as to when, before 
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or after a preferential trade agreement enters into force, notification should take place 
creates intransparency and enables protectionism, and leads to the fact that some 
countries regard the notification process as optional.74 Without notification, parties to 
preferential trade agreement avoid controversial discussion, sustained and pointed 
inquiries and detailed scrutiny of all aspects of proposed agreement. Even if a 
preferential trade agreement is notified and undergoes the examination process, the 
consensus rule in the CTG results in not a single examination report on notified 
preferential trade agreements has been adopted,  the same is valid of a complaint 
procedure, such as the one under Article XXIV:5(c), meaning that the WTO is 
incapable of judging or making recommendation about the WTO conformity of 
preferential trade agreements.75 The consensus rule in the CRTA in case of the 
periodical review of preferential trade agreements has the same non-functional effects. 
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E. Economic Analysis of Public International Law 
 
1. Fundamentals and important components of law and 
economics 
 
Law or legal system can be considered as institution. An institution is defined as 
systems of written or unwritten sets of rules that guide the behaviour of the involving 
parties that recognize and are expected to respect these rules and to sanction those 
violating them.76  Law and economics deals with the application of the theories and 
empirical methods of economics to legal system. The subject as a branch of economics 
is relatively young, dating from the early 1960s, when the property rights and liability 
were analysed in economic terms.77 Since then methods in law and economics have 
been increasingly applied in both in public and private law fields: tort, contract, and 
property law, public administration, constitutional law, criminal law, civil, criminal and 
administrative procedure,  judicial administration, and law enforcement.  
 
Law and economics involves a positive and normative analysis of law, reflecting 
the two fundamental inter-related sets of questions of the subject. The positive analysis 
of law explains the rules and their outcomes as they are, the effects on the involving 
parities and their behaviour, and the social desirability of such rules. Another set of 
questions is, if the rules are not sufficiently desirable, how to improve them, or which 
rules would yield the most desirable results. That is the normative analysis aimed at 
answering what legal norms should be in order to promote the efficiency or efficient 
allocation of resources. The boundary between both types of analysis cannot be drawn 
clearly. 
 
Like other branches of economics, the assumption of ‘homo oeconomicus’ is 
applied in law and economics. This is sometimes termed ‘methodological 
individualism’ or ‘individual sovereignty’78 assumes that each person is in charge of 
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his own utility function, thus selects according to his own personal preference among 
several alternatives the one that yields the highest net utility and is therefore a rational 
evaluative maximizer.  
 
In other economic fields, utility maximisation can be realized for instance 
through possession and utilisation of material and immaterial objects. The parallel of 
objects in law and economics is property rights. Property rights in law and economics is 
different from the identical terms in legal sense, and can be defined as relations among 
individuals that arise from the existence of scarce good and pertain to their use.79 
Property rights are rights of utilisation, disposition of and ownership over material and 
immaterial objects.80 Property rights constitute a subset of all possible actions, 
determined by action capability of a person at a given own costs of action, with regards 
to the treatment of resources. Property rights result from arrangement or institution 
(discussed later in detail) of inter-personal relations with regards to the mutual 
consequences from treatments of resources. Utility maximisation in law and economics 
involves besides utility from the possession and utilisation of objects or resources, such 
as physical objects, information, intellectual property, and also the rights hereto. Each 
individual maximizes his personal welfare by possession and exercise of property 
rights, whereby not only utility can be reaped, but doing so may cause positive and 
negative externalities and is often at a certain level of transaction costs. 
 
‘Transaction costs’ is another important concept in law and economic and can be 
defined as ‘frictional loss’ or costs that incurs in the possession, exchange or exercise of 
property rights, for examples, costs of institution creation (‘time-and-trouble costs’, 
negotiation and bargaining costs), costs stemming from searching, gathering and 
evaluating of information necessary for transactions, legal uncertainty, complexity of 
applicable rules or risks of unpredictable events, but also costs of maintaining institution 
such as law enforcement (such as agreement surveillance or adjudication). The concept 
is important for efficiency analysis of law not only because efficient legal regime should 
help minimize transaction costs, but also because the existence of considerable 
transaction costs is a necessary rationale for institutional arrangements, i.e. legal regime, 
that prescribe an efficient allocation of property rights. For according to Coase’s 
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theorem under the strict assumptions of a few numbers of actors, their cooperative 
behaviour (non-strategic behaviour) and their independent actions, if transaction costs 
are zero, the efficient allocation can be achieved through negotiations and is unaffected 
by institutional arrangement.81  
 
While usually price mechanism regulates person’s transactions of resources on a 
market in economic context, it is usually institution, as legal, administrative and 
customary arrangements for repeated human interaction are defined, that regulates inter-
personal interactions in law and economic context, and necessarily limit what persons 
have capability and resources to do.82 The limitation is necessary, as individual being 
able to realize all possible actions can be socially inefficient due to their transaction 
costs. Therefore institution such as regulations and rules, legal system, legal institution 
and law that regulates and defines the allocation of property rights among involved 
persons is needed to cope with this phenomenon. Institutions thus prescribe individuals’ 
pattern of behaviour. Given the ‘homo oeconomicus’ assumption, a legal system also 
determines the welfare of each individual person. Different legal systems, different 
institutions result in different levels of individual and social welfare. As institution has 
the objective of ensuring optimal welfare and increasing efficiency, the task of law and 
economics is to determine effeciency effect of different institution and to draw 
conclusions as to the efficiency improving effects of institutions, that is to find out 
whether an institution advances optimal welfare in the sense of two relevant efficiency 
concepts: Pareto-improvement (the concerned instutition improves the welfare position 
of all parties) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion (the institution does improve 
aggregate welfare but not necessarily the welfare of all parties but the total welfare and 
allows for compensation scheme so as to prevent a welfare decrease for those whose 
welfare is negatively affected).83
  
 In the efficiency analysis, the individual welfare needs to be captured. It is 
imaginable that this is composed of individual utility and costs incurred from one’s own 
and other individual behaviour. An efficient improving institution should therefore 
enable individual to increase utility and limit transaction costs from exercising property 
rights, by creating incentives for involved individual to behave in a cooperative and 
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adequate manner and to refrain from inefficient behavior that causes negative 
externalities and transaction costs. The incentives are for instance deterrent sanction 
regimes for non-compliance, the precision of the rights and obligations so that any 
positive of negative external effects that stems from exercising of his rights but incurs to 
other subjects are unambigiously attributable to the causer in order to minimize possible 
opportunistic behaviour which is a source of inefficiency.84
 
Despite the fact that the efficiency criteria in law and economics is the more 
widely accepted tools for normative analysis, law and economics has some analysis 
frailities.85 Similar to other fields of economics, law and economics is the study of 
rational choice that evaluates the effects of rational utility maximizing behaviour under 
conditions of scarcity. The philosophical basis of economics, the utilitarianism, is 
rejected by many lawyers as being unsuitable to render a practicable normaltive analysis 
of law.86 Whereas economic theories stress allocative efficiency and welfare 
maximiation, legal scholars try to derive normative solutions in public international law 
from general principles which cannot be broken down to efficiency. Nevertheless, law 
and economists argue that the analysis of law using economic tools and the tangible 
efficiency criteria for social welfare (Pareto- and Kaldor-Hicks-Criterion) is also just 
and suitable, because the outcome suggests a more efficient use of resources without 
loss for any particular legal subject. Moreover, law and economics can effectively 
clarify the issue of expected outcomes of law and provide for alternative legal solutions. 
And because law and economic efficiency analysis usually involves cost-benefits 
analysis, it might have important limitations due to problems of identifiability, 
commensurability and inter-personal comparison of utility necessary for efficiency 
analysis, if it is applied on fields of law with unquantifiable parameters, such as in 
public international law. Tangible effects of law cannot be exactly apprehendended. 
Last but not least, there is the objection concerning the equation of social welfare with 
the aggregation of individual preferences which can be by nature very different.87 In 
accordance with the criticisms, it must be reiterated that the thesis does not present a 
comprehensive efficiency analysis of GATT Article XXIV, which by itself is already 
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complex given the structure of WTO regime, the large number of member countries, 
their different utility function that include elements beyond economic ones. Rather, it 
applies approaches in law and economics, identify relevant factors that are necessary for 
the analysis and collects evidences for these factors in order to be able to draw a 
conclusion whether the Article contribute to a more efficient global trade system.
 
2. Significant characteristics of public international law 
 
The term ‘international law’ or ‘public international law’ was developed from 
the older terminology ‘law of nations’ or ‘droit de gens’ which themselves can be traced 
back from the Roman concept of ius gentium.88 The definition of public international 
law has been developed along with development of the law as regards its subjects. From 
the Westphalian peace treaties (1648) until the first half of the twentieth century, public 
international law was largely defined as the law that governs the relations only between 
states amongst each other, as only states could be subjects of public international law in 
the sense of enjoying full international legal personality and being capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, including the right to bring international claims. In 
general, public international law can be defined as the collection of the legal norms that 
govern the behaviour of the subjects of public international law and not belong to 
domestic norms of these subjects.89 Public international law covers vast and complex 
areas of international concern from traditional topics like position of states, state 
succession, state responsibility, peace and security, war and humanitarian law, 
international treaties, conduct of diplomatic relations, to new areas of regulations, such 
as international economy and development, international organisations, disarmement, 
protection of human rights, environment and energy, etc. 
 
Although public international law is primarily concerned with the legal 
regulation of international intercourse of states as primary subject of law, other actors 
with different degrees of international law subjectivity have emerged in times: 
international organisations, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 
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transnational corporations, and individual persons. International organisations are 
secondary subject of international law, as it has as much legal personality and 
competences as transferred to by states. INGOs, transnation corporations and individual 
persons, in contrast,  are only partially subject to international law. Despite the fact that 
states are no more the sole actors of international relations and other actors have 
emerged in shaping the world order, states continue to play by far the greatest role in 
creating, enforcing and determining public international law, directly or indirectly.  
 
States are organized as territorial entities and consider themselves as ‘sovereign’, 
‘equal’ and ‘independent’. Whereas the political sovereignty defined as the ability to act 
independently is diluted given the political and economic interdependence of states, the 
legal sovereignty which is relevant for the analysis and defined as non-submission to the 
jurisdiction of any other legal subject90 remains and has significant implication on 
public international law and its analysis. The (legal) sovereignty of legally ‘equal’ states 
implies that unlike domestic law, public international law lacks the supreme authority 
and central institution for law making, law implementation and law determination. 
Public international law is thus not a vertical but horizontal legal system and law of 
coordination between actors and not law of subordination.  
 
The non-subordinating and horizontal character of public international law is 
observed in law making and law application process. The decentralised process of law 
making results in different sets of rights and obligations for states which they 
voluntarity submit to or bind themselves with. The binding force and thematical and 
geographical scope of public international law therefore depends on the willingness of 
states to start and participate in the law making process and submit themselves to the 
law. Many legal documents in international law has a character of declaration of 
political conviction, rely on voluntary implementation mechanisms and include various 
reservations. Unlike domestic law, the different, comparatively low degrees of binding 
force is another character of the law that immediately results from the concept of equal 
sovereignty. For this reason, public international law is sometimes called ‘soft law’.91 
Further, in the law making process of public international law, the principle of 
reciprocity plays an important role, since states would be willing to give concessions to 
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other states only if they can expect some benefits in return. This principle is also an 
importnant motif for an effective law application which are generally observed by the 
states themselves. The implementation of a legal obligation towards other states is 
decisively influenced by the prospect of benefits resulting form complying with the 
legal provision and by the prospect of sanctions by other states as consequences of non-
compliance. If they perceived their rights being violated, they can take sanction 
measures by resorting not only to retorsion, an unfriendly yet lawful act, but also to 
reprisals, an unlawful act however justified by a preceding unlawful act such as treaty 
breach by other subjects. Whatever decision of compliance or non-compliance, retorsion 
or reprisal being taken, they are likely to take these actions according to their own ‘costs 
and benefits analysis of foreign policy’92, without being unvoluntarily subordinated to 
any superior organs. Concerning law determing, there is no authority similar to national 
court to adopt universally binding verdict and no compulsory jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals without the consent of the legal subjects. The legal 
effectiveness of public international law is ensured only by its states decision and thus 
depends largely on the latter’s resources.  
 
Besides the horizontal character of law in terms of states, public international 
law has horizontal character as regards main sources. The Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) identifies three as primary sources international 
conventions, customary international law and general principles of law, and  as 
subsidiary sources judicial decisions and renown legal literature.93 ‘International 
convention’ means international treaties, agreements, pacts, understandings, protocolls, 
charters, statutes, accords, covenants, etc. and can be defined as international agreement 
concluded between states and governed by international law.94 Customary international 
law is constituted by two elements: the objective element of general and actual practice, 
that is a factual, consistent and continuous behaviour over a sufficient period of time; 
and the subjective element ‘opinio iuris’, that is the expression of the conviction that a 
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certain form of conduct is required or permitted by the law.95 General principles of law 
means legal principles that stem from domestic legal systems of almost all states and 
have been transplanted to the international level by recognition, such as pacta sunt 
servanda. The ICJ Statute does not provide for hierachical structure of these primary 
sources. The only exception in this connection is the overriding legal position of 
peremptory norms or ius cogens, the example thereof being the prohibition of the use of 
force or the threat thereto or the prohibition of torture.96 Regarding the application of 
law, international treaties, customary international law and general principles of law are 
considered of the equal rank and there might be applicable law on the similar issue but 
of different sources at the same time. Beyond the identified sources, states of public 
international law sometimes also invoke in their action other less binding sources such 
as unilateral legal acts or resolutions of international organisations. 
 
The characteristical differences of public international law give rise to some 
differentiations in economic analysis. Due to the horizontal structure of the law and its 
decentralized law finding, law application and law determination, the adjacent revelant 
legal instruments the analysis has to include become complex and numerous in order to 
correspond to the reality that international norms are developed and applied in 
observance of many other sets of norms. In international law, non-written rules such as 
customs and etiquettes as well as, due to the strong influence of some common law 
states, the verdict or legal opinion of international tribunes and courts are as important 
and valuable to legal institutions and their further development as are written laws like 
international treaties. Finally, recalling that legal institution should enhance efficiency, 
realize adequate behaviour of community member, reduce transaction costs and increase 
legal certainty and costs attributibility through sets of universally recognized and clearly 
defined rules and appropriate incentives including sanctions, the lack of central 
enforcement and determining authority in international law, its weak legislative capacity 
and its less-binding ‘soft law’ character could prompt the feasibility and meaningfulness 
of the economic analysis. 
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3. Perspective of law and economics application on public 
international law: analogy between domestic and international 
‘market’. 
 
In addition to the consideration that law and economics might be less useful in 
the international context, the rejection of fundamental economic philosophy of 
utilitarianism, and incommensurablility, non-comparibility and subordination of non-
economic factors, another main reason for its non-application by legal scholars could be 
the allegedly inaccessible methodologies biased towards quantitative and mathematic 
tools.97 On the economist side, despite the extensive fields of application in domestic 
law,  law and economics has not widely been instrumental in analysis international law, 
even if its efficiency oriented approach can be useful in public international trade law, 
which is predicated and argumented on efficiency.98 Although the less prominent role 
public inernational plays in law and economics can be reasoned by structural limitations 
and methodological constraints, it is possible to draw significant structural analogies 
between domestic and international legal institutions and to find that both contain 
mutually comparable factors. A great potential and possibility for the application of law 
and economics in public international law exists. 
 
In the normative analysis of public international law, that is what the law should 
be, several international lawyers have recognized the limitation posed by state-centrist 
nature of the law and seek both new theories and methodologies in other adjacent 
academic disciplines, notably theories in international relations and international 
political economics99 but less in economics and law and economics,100 even though 
the ultimate objective of the analysis is the legal institutional choice for both law and 
economics and other discipline. Furthermore, law and economics has a comparative 
strength amongs various economic disciplines for legal analysis because it methods 
enable the analysis to extend to fields beyond traditional monetizable markets, that is to 
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maximize multiple and more abstract values simultaneously,101 and thus also to draw 
elements from other non-economic disciplines.
 
Relevant similarities and structural analogies between domestic and international 
legal problems allows for the transfer of approaches and tool from domestic to 
international sphere. Like in a domestic society, international society is a place where 
individual actors or groups of actors carry out their transactions. In doing so, they seek 
to realize their self-defined interest through the most effecacious means under their own 
constraints. Acting for themselves, from their actions of like units emerges a structure, 
e.g. market or other institutions, that affects and constraints all of them.102 At the (still) 
state-dominant international level of transaction, it is comprehensible to assume as 
heutritic tool that states represent these self-interested and utility maximizing units 
given preferences and constraints.103 With reference to the assumptions of the Coase’s 
theorem and the obvious existence of transaction costs in international transactions, it 
can be assumed that these states interact to overcome the deficiencies or other negative 
externalities and to reach higher benefits through establishing (legal) institutions. 
 
The traded assets in the international ‘market’ are not goods and services per se, 
but components of power. In legal sense, this power rests on rights (or jurisdiction) to 
prescribe, enforce and adjudicate, that is in other words to govern, deal with or treat 
goods, services, resources or subjects under jurisdiction such as citizens. This 
jurisdiction or power or rights is identical to property rights in law and economics. In 
this market, states trade in power or trade in rights in order to maximize their baskets of 
preference (utility function), which consequently include not only goods, services or 
subjects, but more importantly also the traded assets: power, rights and influence, and 
non-economic factors such as reputation, credibility, ideas and values. States’ set of all 
possible actions is unlimilited rights to act independently and constraintlessly, or state 
sovereignty, which naturally allows for also ‘negative’ behaviour such as war, genocide 
or grave violation of human rights. The exercise of sovereign rights may cause negative 
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external effects that other states wish to limit. In the international systems, states can 
attempt bilateral persuation through negotiations or reciprocal exchanges or they are 
willing to some extent to relinquish this autonomy by recognizing and declaring binding 
to a certain degree a legal institution overtime – public international law.  
 
For example, in the field of peace and security, states can theoretically start wars 
at any opportune moment. Instead, states recognize public international law concerning 
the general prohibition of use of force and its few exception. The legal institution 
established here, the general prohibition of the use of force, helps states to avoid 
deficiencies, e.g. negative consequences of war, and to reach higher benefits, e.g. 
economic development and increase trade resulting from peace, states’ reputation of 
being peaceful. The relevant sets of action is drastically reduced, and only a certain 
level of power and rights is (comparable with property rights in domestic context) 
allocated to state by the international law (comparable with domestic legal institution). 
 
 As the legal institution of interest in this thesis is immediately based on a set of 
international treaties, it might be interesting to draw some analogies and disanalogies 
that particularly exist between international treaties and contracts which are extensively 
studied in law and economics. Indeed, the WTO dispute settlement bodies regard the 
WTO agreements as the international equivalent of a contract.104 Like contracts, 
treaties serve as a source of rights and obligations between parties in form of mutual 
exchange of promises about future behaviour. Both contain provisions concerning 
validity, breach, interpretation, observation, remedy, modification and termination. Both 
derive their validity from voluntary agreement of two a parties. However, relating to the 
concept of sovereignty, the use of reservation, not existant in contract law, allowing 
state parties to opt out from some treaty obligations and the lack of effective governing 
authority discussed above present the main disanalogies between treaties and 
contracts.105
 
Dunoff and Trachtmann (1998) suggest three stages of development of 
international legal institutions. The first stage is that in which the nature established 
unwritten rule of how subsequent rules will be made by creating states and their 
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endowment and resources. In the second level, states, given constraints and preferences, 
start to trade their rights, establish market-organizing legal institutions of non-coercion 
in order to define their fundamental property rights, and for facilitating additional 
transactions among states. In the third stage, the second generation of institutions can be 
established to facilitate trade and reduce transaction costs.106 The development of 
international legal institutions correspond to this scheme. First, market-organizing legal 
institutions have been developed; fundamental concept of modern public international 
law embodied in the Westphalian treaties (1648), rights of diplomats developed since 
the 18th century, laws of war (ius ad bellum) until early 20th century and laws in war 
(ius in bello) in 1948, Charta of the League of Nations and the United Nations, Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties (1967), Permanent Court of Justice under the 
League of Nations and International Court of Justice, international customs and 
etiquettes to name a few. Then, later in parallel manner, many other legal institutions 
arise, e.g. the GATT/WTO agreements, the so-called Kyoto Protocoll, Human Rights 
Declaration 1948 and subsequent specific conventions, bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, free trade agreements. This implies also that the second generation institutions 
must be analysed by taking into account also the first generation institutions. The 
implication corresponds to the remark in connection with the horizontal character of 
international law made earlier. 
 
With reference to the question of meaningfulness of law and economics in 
public international law mentioned earlier, it is clear that the main weakness presented 
to the analysis lays in the application of the law. Consequently it would make sense in 
some cases for the analysis to distinguish between the rules governing substantive 
matters and the rules concerning law application. Clearly, an efficient legal institution 
must embody efficient both kind of rules. While rules concerning law application 
represent the readiness of states to be bound by the law, the substantive rules in many 
cases represent states’ insightful understanding of problems and encompass efficiency-
enhancing solution, which could be separately analysed as if the law were binding and 
there were an effective judicature. Furthermore, it is also the task of law and economic 
to identify the weakness of a legal institution, by differentiating the law, it could 
identify whether the incurred inefficiency is due to the decentralized and horizontal 
                                                 
106 Ibid., pp. 10-1. 
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structure of public international law which directly affects the law application, or 
embodied in the rules, both substantive and those concerning the application. 
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F. WTO and GATT Article XXIV in Law and Economics 
Context 
 
1. Transaction costs of international trade and the WTO as 
institution 
 
The WTO legal regime does not only set rules for the international interaction in 
trade matters by member states but its member states also confer some authority and 
competency on it as agent in governing and administrating trading relations among 
signatory states. According to law and economics, the emergence and stability of legal 
institution presuppose the existence of substantial transaction costs. It is therefore at this 
stage essential to identify the sources of transaction costs identified in this context as 
costs that states must incur when then interact internationally in trade issues.107 They 
will be mentioned the efficiency analysis of GATT Article XXIV later also. 
 
When states engage in international trade, trade policy of trading partners is 
significant. States are exposed to changes and developments in trade policy of the 
others. The unpredictability of trade policy represent risks that can be regarded as 
source of transaction costs. These costs tend to arise overtime with the expension of 
trade into diverse areas and with new trade policy instruments. The predictibility can be 
enhance by negotiations and bargaining that are likely to result in reciprocal concession 
granting or by gathering and evaluating information from other states to determine their 
trade policy. The costs of bargaining and information processing, both transaction costs, 
can increase with the numbers of involving states and issues. Given an international 
agreement, the costs of policing its implementation and enforcement can be high in 
particular in the absence of supreme authority. In the event of trade disputes, states 
might resort to retorsion and reprisal measures that produce negative externalities. 
Transaction costs from these various sources are not insignificant and gives rise to the 
WTO as legal institution.  
 
The WTO, and before 1994 the GATT, helps enhance predicibilty of and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour in member states’ trade policy through its legal instruments 
which set important principles and rules that help minimize protectionist trade policy 
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measures in a relatively comprehensive manner. The progressive trade liberalization in 
form of gradual reduction of tariff and quantitative barriers to trade and non-tariff trade 
barriers that was achieved through negotiation rounds are declared binding and 
documented in the annexed the countries’ schedule of commitments.108 For non-
agriculture goods in general, the schedule of commitments provides for binding 
commitments on tariffs. For agriculture, the schedule lists binding commitments on 
tariffs, quotas, export subsidies and some types of domestic supports. For services, the 
schedule determines how much market access foreign service providers are allowed in 
each sector and the sectors opt-out from the most favoured nation obligation.  
 
The WTO agreements also limit arbritary trade policy measures through its 
fundamental principles, notably the most favoured nation and national treatment for 
trade in goods and through the regulation of the exception from these principles. In the 
case of trade in goods, these exceptions are provisions concerning the safeguard of the 
balance of payment (GATT Article XII and its Understanding109), the facilitation of 
economic development (Article XVIII and the mentioned Understanding), the 
emergency action on import of particular products (Article XIX, the so-called ‘escape 
clause’), other general exceptions (Article XX), the security exception (Article XXI) 
and, of course, the formation of preferential trade agreements (Article XXIV and its 
Understanding). The agreements and additional Understandings on specific trade policy 
measure also regulate aspects of trade barriers, such as non-tariff barriers to trade, 
technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, safeguard and licensing measures, subsidies, 
government procurement, and anti-dumping. Other agreements deal with specific traded 
issues in order to keep pace with trade expansion and global economic development: 
agriculture, textile and clothing, intellectual property rights Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectuell Property Rights, trade and economic development, trade capacity building, 
the least developed countries, and environment protection.110
 
The mentioned WTO regulations are results of past negotiations and subjected to 
further development through future negotiations. The WTO is the central negotiation 
                                                 
108 Notably, the GATT Article II for trade in goods and the GATS Article XX for trade in services.  
109 Understanding of the Balance of Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/09-bops.pdf.  
110 Annex I of the WTO Treaty, and agreements, understandings, and decisions adopted by the WTO 
trade negotiations committee in http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm, retrieved on 7 
October 2009. 
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forum where member states can convene, exchange information, and bargain and 
exchange concessions with an universally accepted and clearly regulated procedure111, 
which can thus reduce transaction costs and is therefore more efficient than participating 
in different for a with diverse procedures.112 The current main negotiation forum is the 
Trade Negotiation Committee established by the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
functioning under the WTO General Council.113 The negotiations relating to trades of 
goods, the unique set of rules is provided for in the GATT Article XXVIII and XXVIII 
bis and its Understanding.114 For the purpose of negotiations, information has to be 
gathered and evaluated. The WTO reduces the incurred transaction costs by increase 
information access and transparency, storing, monitoring, processing, dissiminating and 
providing accurate information necessary for decision making. This task is mainly 
observed and procedurally regulated by the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.115 
Moreover, looking at the regime as incomplete contracts due to uncertainty about future 
events, in the events of external shocks in which some members might have rational 
incentives to secretly introduce unlawful hidden measures under the pretext of special 
circumstances116, an institution such as the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism can 
help extracting information about the taken measures and provent inefficiency resulting 
from information imbalances. 
 
The WTO facilitates the implementation, administration and operation of the 
WTO agreements.117 The WTO ensures that states policy be coherent and compliant 
with the WTO rules through minimizing interpretative ambiguity, since not all relevant 
situations and the resulting opportunistic behaviour can be foreseen, by effective 
determining of regulations, whereby it reduces transaction costs in many aspects.  
 
                                                 
111 Article III:2 of the WTO Treaty. 
112 Ludema, R. D. (2001), Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures, 
European Journal of Political Economy 17, 3, p. 374. 
113 Paragraph 46 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference, 
Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted on 14 November 2001, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf, retrieved on 8 November 2009. 
114 GATT Article XXVIII, and The Understanding, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/12-28.pdf, retrieved on 8 Noverber 2009. 
115 Article III:4  and the Annex 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO treaty. 
116 WTR 07, p. 117., Dunoff, pp. 21-2. 
117 Article III:1 of the WTO Treaty. 
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First, when a trade dispute occurs, its law determining process is likely to 
involve the calculation of damage which generally cannot be observed by all parties and 
are difficult to assess. Since the victim state(s) would probably overstate and the 
other(s) would play down the costs resulting on prolongation of dispute and costs, a 
neutral body is needed to arbitrate between the two and calculate the true damage.118  
 
Second, the settlement of trade disputes through bilateral negotiations is likely to 
be more costly than defering it to the WTO dispute settlement bodies and accepting 
their rulings. Such jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement bodies also 
considerably reduce transaction costs by precising the rules interpretation and 
application and contribute to further regime development.  
 
Third, in connection with inefficient opportunistic behaviour and the 
adjudicative role of the WTO, the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO can be 
regarded as regime-stabilising ‘honest broker’. The victim states whose rights under 
WTO regulations have been violated are expected not to resort to dramatic retaliations, 
nor to cease cooperation forever, but rather to return to the regime to profit from future 
cooperation. That’s because leaving cooperation forever would deprives the same 
punishing victim state of gains from international trade. Knowing that the retalitation is 
limited and punishment is credible only to a certain extent, states might have incentives 
to deviate from trade rules that they have previously agreed with each other in order to 
reach higher benefits in short-term, causing inefficiency and risks of institutional 
uncertainty. If the retaliation takes place, regardless of the degree, it can be responded 
by counter-retaliation, the dispute may set off a downward spiral of mutual reprisals that 
endangers the whole regime.119 It is therefore argued that the WTO dispute settlement 
as an independent and external legal institution empowered to judge trade disputes and 
impose costs in form of credible punishment for non-compliance is needed in order to 
effectively solve this problem and maintain cooperative regime.120 The WTO dispute 
settlement bodies are provided for by the Article III:3 of the WTO Treaty. The 
                                                 
118 Sykes, Alan O. (2000), ‘The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?’, in Bronckers, M. and Quick, R. (ed.), New 
Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 347-9. 
119 Schwartz, W. F. and Sykes, Alan O. (2002), ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System’, Journal of Legal Studies, 31, 1 (hereinafter Schwarzt and Sykes 
2002), pp. S198-9. 
120 WTR 07, p. 115. 
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objectives and procedures are regulated in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(Annex 2 of the WTO Treaty), wherein different types of dispute settlement are offered 
and institutionalised: conciliation and mediation (Article 5), arbitration (Article 25) and 
adjudication through Panel and Appelate Body (Article 6-19).121
 
 The adjudicative competences of the WTO should not be overvalued as being 
supreme adjudicative authority that effectively minimizes transaction costs. The WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms remain a relatively weak sanction system, unless the 
agreement is able to impose excessive costs on violating member for non-compliance 
with the rulings.122 Despite the legally binding character of their jurisprudence, the 
dispute settlement bodies do not allow for central verdict enforcement mechanism but 
rather place the enforcement of the involved parties. The violating state is required to 
bring its policy into conformity with its obligations with a period of time. Unless so, the 
claiming party is permitted ask for compensation from or suspend concessions toward 
the violating state.123 Ultimately, the mechanism could return to self-help system with 
the associated transaction costs effects. 
 
2. Understanding the WTO and GATT Article XXIV as law and 
economics institution 
 
The WTO can be seen as a complex, multiparty forum for barter between 
nations that allows each nation to represent the interests of its constituents to other 
nations, and facilitates agreements that reduce the harmful external effects of national 
policy.124 In law and economics, legal institution like GATT Article XXIV is part of 
multiple possible bargaining outcomes that is chosen because it provides for higher 
benefits to all than without it. The elements for law and economics should be identified 
for the purpose of the analysis of institution in accordance with the analogy between 
domestic and public international law discussed earlier. Corresponding to the analogy 
drawn earlier in section E, the mentioned international transactions are primarily not the 
                                                 
121 Article III:3 of the WTO Treaty, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf, retrieved on 8 November 2009. 
122 Schwartz and Sykes 2002, p. 188, and Posner, Richard A. (2002), ‘Some Economics of International 
Law: Comment on Conference Papers’, Journal of Legal Studies, 31, 1, p. S327. 
123Article 21(3) and 22(1)-(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
124 Gerhart, P. (2003), ‘The Two Constitutional Visions of the WTO’, Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law, 24, 1 (hereinafter Gerhart), p. 30. 
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exchange of goods and service per se but states’ choice of international trade policy. 
The set of possible action remains generally the all possible state sovereign actions 
constrained by state-specific exogenously given factors such as resource endowment, 
and specifically in the context of the analysis of GATT Article XXIV all possible trade 
policy measures, particularly trade policy discrimination and prefential treatment of 
particular trade partners, introduction of trade barrier or protectionist measures, 
conclusion of or ascension to a bilateral or regional trade agreement, compliance or 
breach of a trade agreement or any trade retaliation. States cannot take all actions in the 
set due to legal institution generally in form of public international law, and specifically 
for the analysis the provision and in the WTO agreements. States’ property rights 
encompass transactions or policy actions in trade matters permissible under WTO 
agreements. In case of the Article, the property rights are the rights to establish 
preferential trade agreements under specific conditions and subject to treatments 
provided for in the Article. States maximize their self-defined utility function with the 
set of policy measures in connection with preferential trade agreements, that is with 
property rights that are allocated by the Article. If all of them can reach a higher level of 
welfare under permissible actions under the Article than without it, the Article is 
welfare increasing and efficiency-enhancing and thus sustained.  
 
To show whether and how the Article fulfil this role, which is the main task of 
the thesis, the concept of efficiency of the Article should be developed. The efficiency 
of the Article depends significantly on states’ utility maximization given the property 
rights. Both issues should thus be discussed in detail. 
 
3. Elements of states’ utility function 
 
As mentioned earlier, the diversity of utility functions of states party to an 
international institution presents a disadvantage to law and economics which analyses 
these functions. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that the elements of utility 
function reflecting the motivations of different states to conclude trade agreements is 
sufficiently coherent across states for the analysis purpose. The reasons are that, first, 
different states are likely to have overall similar objectives and motivations when they 
are engaging in trade matters, although it is likely that a state has a different set of 
prioritized objectives when it concludes trade agreements with different states. Second, 
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since the design of any institution is shaped fundamentally by the underlying goals 
pursue by the involving parties, being parties to the WTO agreements implies states 
parties share some sets of coherent goals that are consistent enough to be 
institutionalised, and are convinced that these goals be realized within the WTO 
institutional framework.  
 
The WTO agreements and preferential trade agreements are trade agreements. 
States’ motivations to conclude an agreement is what the institution should help realize 
and thus constituting its rationale by which its efficiency is to be measured.125 At first 
sight, the main elements (state motivation) can be discovered in the agreement itself, as 
the goals of the states parties to an international agreement is enshrined in its 
preambular paragraphs: expansion of trade and production, economic development 
driven by efficiency created by optimal use of resources. The stated ‘goals’ such as 
elimination of trade discrimination or reciprocal reduction of trade barriers are not 
considered as elements of utility function. They are trade policy measures and thus 
property rights in law and economics sense.126
 
States’ objectives in trade matters are beyond national income maximization. 
Accordingly, the motivation is more complex than to be documented in a trade 
agreement and reflects besides economic consideration also political and legal 
deliberation, since the agreement will have political and legal effects on the conduct of 
international relations. Therefore, approaches in different disciplins of economics, 
international relations, and legal studies help going beyond monetizable factors capture 
not only the economic, but also political and legal elements constituting states’ ultility 
function. 
 
3.1 Economic Approach 
 
Generally, international economic theories believe that the main expected 
advantages from trade liberalisation are trade increase and efficient allocation of 
resources according to their comparative advantage. Every advancement towards global 
                                                 
125 WTR 07, p.195. 
126 Preambular paragraphs of the WTO Treaty, the GATT 1947, Article XXIV: 4 and the preambular 
paragraphs of the Understanding of GATT Article XXIV. 
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free trade is likely to be efficiency-enhancing.127 In new trade theories, the market 
access gained in trade liberalisation is equivalent to the increase market size that would 
allow firms to exploit economics of scale, produce at lower costs and thus becoming 
more competitive. A larger market size may increase country’s attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment. The formation of a trade agreement in form of custom union and free 
trade area may be also motivated by the increase of their bargaining power in the 
context of multilateral negotiations. 
 
If these motivations were the only motivations for trade agreements, 
international trade or at least preferential trade agreements would be characterized by 
completely free trade, and the trade liberalisation would be swift and comprehensive. 
However, trade liberalisation in reality in most items started from very high trade 
barriers and was negotiated step-by-step. And even ‘free’ trade areas or customs unions 
may entail trade barriers between the constituting members. The following discussion 
focuses on to particular branches of economic theories that not only are central to 
explaining state motivation for concluding trade agreements but also have the starting 
point of the analysis from a realistic situation where high trade barriers are in place: 
international trade theories and political economics. 
 
International trade theories 
 
(New) international trade theories claim terms of trade improvement as 
motivation to conclude trade agreements. The approach is based on two assumptions 
that governments use tariffs to manipulate the terms of trade, and that governments seek 
to maximize national welfare at the same time. Terms of trade is a measure of the 
relative price of a country’s import and exports. If a country is able to lower the price of 
its imports relative to its export, or raise the price of its exports relative to its imports, 
then its terms of trade improves or in other words its national income and welfare 
increase. Although it has been assumed that large countries can influence the world 
price through optimal tariff setting and thus its terms of trade, even small countries with 
                                                 
127 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (2002), the Economics of the World Trading System, Boston: 
MIT (hereinafter Bagwell and Staiger 2002), pp. 2-4, Feenstra, Robert C. (2003), Advance International 
Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-98. 
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differentiated products may have some market power and their optimal tariff, if tends to 
be positively correlated with their market power.128
 
A government manipulates the terms of trade by setting its tariffs to change the 
world price, and in doing so to gain welfare. When the government is motivated by 
terms-of-trade consideration, a country may apply a tariff to lower the price of its 
imports, thereby, being large country, reduces world demand of the imported products, 
depress the price and thus generates a terms-of-trade benefits. But the terms-of-term 
benefits must be subtracted by the costs of the tariff, which arises because the distortion 
of the resource allocation tariff introduces. Nonetheless, large countries can be better 
off, at least in short term, with such policy which incurs negative externalities that, as 
Bagwell and Staiger state, is shifted to other countries.129 If every country increase the 
tariffs hoping for gains and shifting costs to other, the relative price might not change. 
The net terms-of-trade gain is less than the costs its imposes of trade partners. All end 
up in the inefficient Nash equilibrium of Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The inefficiency is 
reflected in excess protection, that is the market access is too small. The role of 
cooperation is therefore to provide a mechanism through which the inefficiency is 
corrected and market access is set to the efficient level – that generally does not mean 
free trade but an efficient level of protection. As market access is exchanged in 
reciprocal manner in negotiations, gradually moving the players of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game from the the inefficient equilibrium field to the diagonal field. This 
argument gives rise to main feature of trade liberalisation applied in the WTO (for 
instance GATT Article XXVIII) and most preferential trade agreements – the 
reciprocity130. Summing up, a trade agreement might eliminate the inefficiency by 
providing for freer trade, and the approach shows that terms-of-trade is a relevant 
motivation for countries engaging in any trade institution. 
 
Political economics 
 
                                                 
128 Gros, D. (1987), ‘A Note on the Optimal Tariff, Retaliation and the Welfare Loss from Tariff War in a 
Framework with Intra-Industry Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 23, p. 366. 
129 Bagwell and Staiger 2002, p. 28. 
130 In fact, governments with terms-of-trade considerations will always prefer reciprocal liberalisation and 
trade negotiation would make no sense without reciprocity, Ethier, W. J. (2004), ‘Political Externalities, 
Non-discrimination, and a Multilateral World’, Review of International Economics, 12, 3 (hereinafter 
Ethier 2004), p. 311 and 317. 
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The political economy approach also is based basically on the terms of trade as 
main motivation for trade policy. In this set up, governments are seen as the supplier of 
trade policies. The governments aims at maximize national welfare subject to political 
constraints.131 Terms-of-trade motives and political supports for government are the 
determining factors of trade policy. How high the protection level is, according to 
Baldwin (2006), determined by the intersection of the positively sloping protection 
demand curve, i.e. the readness of firms to support the government, and the positively 
sloping protection supply curve, defined as how much the government will be willing to 
supply protection at a given firms support. The level of protection is in any case higher 
than the inefficiency-correcting, optimal level that has been found under traditional 
approach which is also the level that national-welfare maximizing the government 
desires.132 The reciprocal exchange of trade concession is in this approach very 
essential for any trade agreement, because it will convert exporters to opponents to 
protection-demanding importer within their own country. When trade concession is 
reciprocal, exporters can gain better market access only when tariff in their own country 
is lowered. This reduce the slope the protection demand curve, leading to lower level of 
protection provided for in the trade agreement. The level and sector of trade 
liberalisation reflect government’s political choice of sector supported. Since a lower 
level of protection will reduce the number of protection-demanding import sectors and 
increase the number of exporters, the initial liberalisation will trigger pressure for 
further liberalisation by exporting sectors.133
 
Furthermore, a trade argeement can pursuing efficiency-enhancing economic 
policy as signaling devise and instrument to solve the time-inconsistency problem of 
government’s economic policy. In the pursuit of a particular policy, the announced 
policy will not be credible when the announced implementation period arrives, 
especially if such policy concerns the competitiveness enhancement, leading to the 
opening up, of an inefficient sector whose maintaining costs will be unsustainble. If the 
announcement is credible, the sector will decide for restructuring and investing in cost-
saving technologies. Otherwise, especially when the industry regards the announcement 
as empty threat, the industry will not be liberalized and the government will continue to 
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Oath to Global Free Trade’, The World Economy, 29, 11 (hereinafter Baldwin 2006), pp. 1458-9. 
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live with inefficiency. A trade agreement can increase the policy credibility by 
providing for external threat and effective enforcement mechanism.134 The 
government may also enter to a trade agreement to specifically prevent any foreseeable 
developments that might lead to inefficient resource allocation or sectors with strong 
lobbying power and to accelerate the structural reform.135
 
3.2 International relation theories 
 
Some motivations for trade cooperation from theorical perspectives in 
international relations have similarities with those resulting from economic discussion. 
In the ‘more traditional’, statist international relation theories, states are unitary actors, 
play more prominent role and their preferences are taken as exogeneously given. They 
include the two most prominent theories of international relations explaining 
international cooperation: neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism developed from 
classical liberalism, and neo-realism developed from classical realism. Neoliberalism 
and neorealism are rationalist statist theories, because states as the central actor are self-
interested, goal-seeking and utility maximizing actor.136 The further development of 
international cooperation in the 20th century gives rise to another statist international 
relation theory: constructivism or strong cognitivism. In contrast to statist theories, the 
non-statist theories concentrate on the sub-state domestic agents and the question as to 
how international cooperation is shaped and affected by dometic politics. The non-
statist theories of international cooperation are developed in a parallel manner to the 
statist ones: liberalism and weakly cognitivism. 
 
Neoliberalism 
 
The foundation of GATT and the WTO are based on the (neo-) liberal ideas in 
international economics and international relation theories, which stress the importance 
of welfare-enhancement through economic liberalisation and international cooperation. 
Neoliberalism therefore merits some attention. Nevertheless, neoliberalism or neoliberal 
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 57
institutionalism in general does not provide further motivations for state to conclude 
trade agreements than international economics. The motivation is the efficiency gain 
through correction of deficits, such as collective action dilemmas, transaction costs and 
information asymmetries that arise because of states’ rational behaviour. In such 
situations, international regime allows states to cooperate by providing information, 
reducing uncertainty and lowering transaction costs. In the area of international trade,  
similar to the tradition approach in international economics, trade agreements firstly, 
help states overcome terms-of-trade inefficiency, termed in neoliberalism as negative 
world-price externalities.137 Additionally, trade agreement can be viewed as 
instrument for cost reductions in terms of negotiating, drafting, launching and 
maintaining trade regime. For this second reason, cooperation in trade will take place 
irrespective of size and market power, as long as there is expected efficiency gains from 
the cooperation. The form of trade cooperation, multilateral, bilateral or plurilateral, 
depends on the market imperfections to be resolved, the negotiation environment, the 
negotiation costs and the expected gain for continued cooperation. The non-statist 
rationalist counterpart of neoliberalism is liberalism (in international relation sense). For 
liberalism, states’s preferences are endogenously determined by domestic rational self-
interested individual and social groups preferences translated by domestic institution 
and process and states pursue their preferences under constraints imposed by the 
preference of other states. Trade negotiators have to secure political support of domestic 
constituents or special interest group by taking into account their efficiency concerns 
while cooperating internationally.138 While liberalism is instrumental in explaining 
policy determination process, it does not give rise to motivation for trade other than 
those mentioned earlier. 
 
Neorealism 
 
Whereas neoliberal institutionalism highlights the efficiency gain as the motif 
for cooperation, neorealism stresses instead on relative gains compared with other actors 
and compared with alternative non-cooperative policy, as the relative gain can 
eventually be transformed to higher relative military capability and political influence 
and create dependence. Therefore, power distribution and accumulation and dependence 
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are the main motif of coopeartion according to the theory. Securiy-obsessed and self-
help countries do not cooperate to reap primarily welfare-enhancing mutual efficiencies, 
but rather try to ‘squeeze out’ as many concessions from other countries to be on a 
higher power rank. Trade agreements are seen as strategic complement to political and 
military cooperation. The approach seems not to explain why countries conclude trade 
agreements, but helps in explain their extent and boundaries, especially between large 
and smaller countries. Generally, the extent and depth of a trade agreement involving 
large countries depend on their security ambition and credibility, as smaller countries 
are willing to join the agreement if large countries can credibly ensure that they will not 
opportunistically exploit the agreement and provide adequate concessions, economic, 
political or military nature.139 But in extreme cases, large countries may use trade 
agreements to increase dependence of small countries which face only with two 
alternatives: entering sometimes disadvantageous agreements or becoming even worse 
off from non-entering. Smaller countries can usually either take side with large 
countries to survive politically and flourish economically, or form trade agreements 
with other smaller countries to counterbalance large countries.  
 
Cognitivisms 
 
Constructivist or strongly cognitivist theories argue that rationalist statist 
theories fail to account for the role of ideas in shaping state policy and that international 
coopertaion can be explained by normative structure that shapes states’ identity.140 
Owing to the observation of historical development of multilateral institutions, it is 
according to constrictivism largely values and ideas prevailing in international system 
that motivate and shape international cooperation, also in trade affairs. Countries that 
usually share common ideas and coherent goals tend to form institution, because ideas 
can influence states behaviours only when they are embodied in institutions which in 
turn legitimate and disseminate these ideas. For trade cooperation, one of the ideas is for 
example the peace promoting quality of trade. Multilateral and preferential trade 
agreements reduce risk of conflict by gradually increasing trust, making countries 
interdependence through increased trade and specialisation. Post-war European 
integration is an important example of a trade agreement for which peace was a primary 
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motivation.141 The non-statist counterpart of constructivm is the so-called ‘weakly 
cognitivist’ theories, which likewise focuses on ideas and values as motivation, but 
stresses the role of the network of experts with recognized competence in a particular 
domain, the so-called moral entrepreneur, in shaping states’ values needed for 
international cooperation. 
 
3.3 Legal Approach 
 
Legal approach to the rationale for trade agreement is based on two fundamental 
concepts. First, individual citizens are the only legitimate political principal and they are 
interested in possessing fundamental economic rights of free exchange and free 
enterpreneurship. Second, political agents, namely the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches for government, are sometimes not guided by national interests as defined by 
the legitimate political principal, and cause government failure through rent-seeking 
behaviour. In a domestic society, this is corrected through constitution, which protects 
equal rights of citizens against political misbehaviour by allocating lawmaking, decision 
making and control function among individuals and institutions. Every economic actor 
is born with inalienable economic rights derived from the fundamental rights, such as 
freedom from discriminatory competition, arbitrary taxation, expropriation, freedom to 
engage in free economic exchange. These rights can be protected domestically by 
constitution.142 Since these rights are exercised both in domestic and international 
context, that is economic actors must be able exercise them in international transactions, 
the same basic rationale likewise applies for trade agreements which in similar manner 
can be regarded as ‘constitution’. 
 
Government’s international trade policy may be subject to special interest 
groups who dominate elected officials and tend to call for protectionism. Citizens wish 
to reduce inefficient rent-seeking by special interest groups and therefore wish to 
eliminate possibility to protectionism and discriminatory trade policy by pegging 
domestic decision to a trade agreement.143 Trade agreements can thus function as the 
second defence line of citizens’ economic rights. This motivation can be realized, 
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mainly because, first, trade agreements prevent arbitrary and competition-distorting 
trade policy by providing for concrete sanctions by trading partners, and, second, 
similar to argument by political economy approach, trade agreements gradually reduce 
the lobbying power of domestic pro-protectionist groups. However, rent-seeking and 
other protectionist measures can also come from foreign traders and governments. By 
raising protectionist barrier, foreign countries deprive domestic exporters of contracting 
rights and market freedom, for instance. This taxation by foreign government without 
representation in it can be solved by trade agreements, because they allow citizens to 
participate in and control the making of foreign countries’ trade policy.144 By all the 
virtues of the legal approach, the main criticism of this approach is that, even though 
inefficient rent-seeking is plausibly identified as motivation for trade agreements, it 
does not correspond to reality. Citizens’ participation in trade negotiation is still limited, 
domestically and internationally, so that trade agreements between government still fail 
to minimize the risk of international government failure, precisely because self-
interested, rent-seeking governments are the one who negotiate the deals.145
 
4. Concluding remarks: Efficiency analysis of the GATT Article 
XXIV  
 
The GATT Article XXIV is an efficient institution if it advances the aggregate 
welfare of the WTO trade community, composing of the welfare of individual members 
of the institution, in the sense of Pareto improvement or satisfying the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion. The welfare of each individual member can be approximated by individual 
utility, defined by utility function, transaction costs and other externalities. The analysis 
should answer the question as to whether the Article enables the individual members to 
advance their welfare through incentives for adequate trade policy concerning the 
formation of preferential trade agreements. The preceding essay identifies sources of 
transaction costs: trade policy uncertainty, legal uncertainty and complexity, negotiation 
costs, information gathering and evaluation costs, trade policy monitoring costs, 
enforcement and adjudication costs, and elements of states’ utility function: national 
income (exports and foreign investments), terms of trade improvement, efficiency 
(efficient resource allocation, rent-seeking reduction, pursuit of efficiency-enhancing 
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policies), security (political and military power, peace, integration and good 
neighbourliness). This list is however non-exhaustive, and although some elements are 
arguably inter-dependent and inquantifiable, they are able to serve as components for 
the analysis to draw a plausible conclusion.   
 
 Due to the weakness of analysis given the special characteristics of public 
international law regarding law and economics, it is almost impossible to formalize and 
accurately quantify the utility function and transaction costs of each WTO member state 
in a comprehensive manner. Therefore the efficiency analysis of the Article will answer 
the main question by providing evidences about the effects of the Article on the 
elements of utility function and transaction costs only in qualitative manner, recalling 
that the main thesis question deals with the welfare comparison between the situation 
when the co-existence of the WTO multilateral trade regime and preferential trade 
agreement without the regulations by the Article and the situation without the Article. 
That is, having identified sources of transaction costs and elements of the states’ utility 
function, the efficiency analysis of GATT Article XXIV can be made possible by 
looking at the rule effects on the identified elements which are embodied in the 
efficiency backdrops of the world without the Article and draw concluding 
comparisons. 
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G. Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements on the WTO 
Multilateral Trade Regime 
 
1. The Rationale of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
 
While the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) is one of integral principles of WTO 
trade regime and in most preferential trade agreements, the latter themselves constitute a 
stern contrast to the MFN itself. In the WTO context, GATT Article XXIV is an 
important exception to MFN. Unlike other exceptions, which enables members to 
engage in discriminatory practices, the Article empowers members to convey ‘extra-
preferential’ treatment above the previous level of MFN to some members.146 It is 
therefore necessary for a complete economic analysis of the Article to survey the 
rationale of the MFN as well as its virtues and backdrops regarding states’ welfare. The 
elaboration serves at later stage as a base for the analysis which shows specifically in 
the WTO context that the coexistence of preferential trade agreements and the overall 
WTO regime may not be efficient.  
 
The MFN commitment runs throughout the WTO legal regime, in trade in 
goods, service and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. In case of the 
GATT, the MFN specified in unconditional and positive manner, stipulates that: 
 
‘Any advantages, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties.’147
 
Discriminating treatment such as different regulations, standards, formalities, 
different tariff rates, amongst member countries is prohibited. The negotiation 
concessions documented in the annexed schedule of commitment must be accorded to 
every other member. By enshrining the MFN in the first article and as one of the two 
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articles that requires a unanimous vote for amendment, the drafters made clear that 
discrimination among trading partners would be the exception rather than rule.148  
 
The MFN becomes relevant when there are more than two trading countries or in 
a multilateral setting. It is at first curious to see why government should be interested in 
committing themselves to extending concession made in negotiation between two or 
very few countries to all members of the WTO or particular trade agreement, especially 
since the MFN has been one of main principles of most trade agreements since the 17th 
century. The emergence of MFN stemmed from the declined of mercantilism. In the 
period until the formation of the GATT in 1947 concessions were granted on the 
condition of receiving adequate compensation, the conditional MFN. The unconditional 
MFN was characteristic to the US trade policy since the 1920s in order to motivate 
other countries to do the same. The modern day version of MFN is a direct descendent 
of the MFN clauses in bilateral and plurilateral agreements between the US and its 
trading partners.149
 
Welfare-increasing role of the MFN 
 
The efficiency-enhancing character of the MFN is most apparent because 
inefficiencies arise at its absence. Without the MFN, two countries granting each other 
trade concession has incentives to conduct bilateral trade negotiations with another non-
participating country. This ‘bilateral opportunism’ can erode the benefits from their 
agreement.150 One of the two countries, assumed country A, can enter into another 
agreement with a third country, country C, that harms the other country, country B, by 
reducing the value of the initial reciprocal commitment made by offering better terms of 
market access C. The value of concessions is eroded in the future through 
discrimination, the so-called ‘concession-erosion’ problem. B facing with this 
possibility would be willing to offer less in the initial negotiation and the scope of trade 
deals would be diminished.151 By stipulating non-discriminatory behaviour, B can be 
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assured that the market access granted to A will not be diverted entirely to one of its 
competitor at a later stage (concession diversion), and if C is bound be the MFN, then 
any concession it offers to A will be extended to all of its competitors, and the further 
trade deal made between A and C will amount to further reciprocal liberalisation. This 
removes the incentives for A to deal sequentially and encourage all countries to make an 
optimal deal at the first place. 
 
Another kind of inefficiency occurs in the case of different productivity. The 
incentives of discrimination will arise if one country (its firms) is more productive than 
the other. The most productive country will have higher rents and the importing country 
will want to impose higher tariffs on that country as this generates highest tariff 
revenues. This, however, punishes the most productive country and shifts the 
production to less efficient country that is granted the better market access, leading to 
inefficient allocation of resources. The MFN prevents the inefficiencies resulting from 
the discrimination, and enables all countries to reap benefits from trade agreement at the 
greatest possible extent through efficient production structure. 
 
The MFN significantly also advances welfare by enlarging the regime’s 
geographical scope. First, the MFN makes it attractive for non-members to enter into an 
existing agreement, since they get access to a package of low tariffs.152 Second, it 
provides reason for small countries to join a trade agreement. Country with less market 
power should have no incentives to raise trade barriers, and their pre-liberalisation 
optimal trade barriers are low. This can be a great disadvantage in the negotiation 
process toward reciprocal trade liberalisation with larger countries, as without MFN 
large countries may consider the reciprocal concessions from smaller countries not 
substantial enough reciprocal substantial concession. The MFN ensures that concessions 
granted to other larger countries are extended to small countries. 
 
From a political economic perspective, Grossman and Maggi (1997) state that 
the non-discrimination commitment specifies trade policy such that subversion of 
government policy through strong lobbying groups at the expense of weaker groups is 
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reduced by reducing incentives to engage in wasteful political lobbying.153 In the case 
of the WTO, Krishna (1998) finds that without the MFN, special-interest lobbying 
groups may effectively pressure the government to engage in preferential trade 
agreements which are detrimental to national welfare to prevent any possible future 
multilateral trade deal. The MFN allows the government to overcome this inefficiency 
and to pursue efficiency-enhancing policy.154
 
It is argued that MFN has political benefits, as the prohibition of discrimination 
prevent states from applying trade policy as coercive political tools thus mitigating 
tensions that would otherwise arise. Trade on a non-discriminatory basis promotes 
cooperation on the basis of national conception of self-interest that prefers production to 
war, and has thus war-preventing and peace promoting nature.155 Nevertheless, from 
the neo-realist point of view, the MFN imposes constraint on the conduct of foreign 
policy, while the potential gains from trade cannot be translated into significant military 
advance compared with other states, even if the effectiveness of economic measures as 
foreign policy instrument is limited and questionable.156 The political benefits from the 
MFN seems ambiguous and less significant given that the MFN neither is the main 
foreign policy instruments with regard to peace and integration, nor has restrictive 
impact on power politics instrument. 
 
Furthermore,  Viner (1924) points out that even in situations where 
discriminatory trade policy is desirable, the administration costs to maintain the whole 
regime can be high for both government and firms because of the need to keep trace of 
goods origin, especially for those not produced in a single country, and the relevant 
administrative procedure.157 The MFN helps reduces the complexity of trade regimes 
through creating transparency and uniformity in tariffs rules for the government, and the 
costs of information for other governments, thus facilitating further trade negotiations. 
A trading regime without an MFN obligation creates an opportunity to threaten to create 
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a discriminatory sub-regime. This possibility can be followed by counter-threats and 
retaliation that immensely increase transaction costs by making for uncertain and 
instable trade regime, threatening the gains from reciprocal trade liberalisation.158 The 
MFN provision is therefore important for regime stability, legal certainty and necessary 
complement to the reciprocity principle. The MFN also contributes to the regime 
stability by reducing incentives for a renegotiation not leading to further liberalisation 
or a revision of concession. Any WTO member wishing to do so is confronted with the 
fact that the affected parties in this case are all other WTO members, who are now 
entitled to equivalent compensation in form of concession on other goods. Withdrawing 
concession in a tariff line would result in granting concession in many other lines, and 
that for all other members.159 The MFN provisions means that the costs of 
renegotiation can be high and caused by concessions granted not only to the affected 
parties but practically all WTO members. 
 
Welfare-reducing role of the MFN 
 
MFN as rule of negotiation has influence on further liberalisation process. In this 
regard, it has both positive and negative role, that is liberalisation-advancing and 
impeding effect. The positive contribution, the elimination of ‘concession erosion’ was 
discussed in connection with ‘bilateral opportunism’. The decelerating contribution of 
the MFN to liberalisation process originates from its ‘foot-dragging’ and relating ‘free-
rider’ effects, which represent a potential costs of bargaining under the MFN. 
 
‘Foot-dragging’ is a negative effect of the MFN in the sense that it provides 
countries with incentives to hold back from making deals in order to maintain 
bargaining chips for future negotiations.160 If country A expects in a later date to start 
the bargaining with country C on the same good as it is doing with country B, it will 
have to extend the concession negotiated with B to C due to the MFN, thereby losing 
bargaining chip. Therefore, country A may offer little concessions to B in order to retain 
stronger position for subsequent negotiations with C. The reservation of A tends to be 
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higher, the larger C, and thus the higher its pre-negotiation optimal tariffs is.161 The 
MFN thus prevents some countries from going further in liberalization, causing 
inefficiency by limiting potential welfare improvement from both individual and global 
perspective. In the WTO context, however, the ‘single undertaking principle’ introduced 
during the Uruguay Round and applied in the current Doha Round should effectively 
the incentives to foot-drag by providing that the negotiations form a single package of 
about 20 subjects and that the package will be accepted universally before being signed 
with a single signature without any option to pick and choose between different 
subjects.162 In the view of the future ascension to the WTO of new members not yet 
present at the Doha round, Bagwell and Staiger (2002) point that the WTO provides for 
ample opportunity for renegotiation. The current members should negotiate without 
foot-dragging to reap the highest benefit of liberalisation. Should the negotiations with 
the potential WTO member fails, the WTO provides for renegotiations involving all 
parties.163
 
 A country free-rides when it can capture the gains from unreciprocated 
concessions resulting from trade deals of other countries granted to them by the MFN. 
A country may reject an offer in order to let other countries reach agreements from 
which it can benefit without having to make concessions itself. It may be tempted to 
understate its concession, hoping that another country will offer the concession that 
induces the counter-concession it desires to benefit from. This is inefficient because the 
country accepting the offer or offering an optimal concession would lead to further 
concession exchange thus further liberalisation164, and because further liberalisation 
with the free-riding country may become more difficult, having no bargaining chip (as 
was the case in the GATT/WTO before the Uruguay Round – ‘foot-dragging’ 
effect).165
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2. Efficiency effects of preferential trade agreements on the 
WTO multilateral trade regime 
 
Having discussed the MFN in general context, this part aims at first identifying 
rationale for preferential trade agreements as opposing to the MFN in the context of the 
WTO multilateral regime and more importantly the sources of inefficiency caused by 
discrimination in form of preferential trade agreements in the world in which 
preferential trade agreements coexist with the WTO regime. The information about the 
effects of preferential trade agreements on the efficiency of the WTO trade regime is 
crucial for the analysis of the GATT Article XXIV.  
 
In the real world, preferential trade agreements coexist with the WTO 
multilateral trade regime. It is hardly obvious a priori that discrimination systematically 
harms countries interests in general. Rather, a preferential trade agreement usually helps 
their member extend their welfare while harms non-members, meaning that countries 
sometimes find it is more efficient for themselves to conclude preferential trade 
agreements, and if the welfare extension is less than the harms, it reduces the welfare of 
the WTO trade community. This part will first briefly discuss the rationale of 
concluding preferential trade agreements. Then it will look at their efficiency effects on 
the WTO trade community. 
 
2.1 Rationale for preferential trade agreements 
 
Preferential trade agreements can help single countries increase their market size 
and provide firms in member countries with a competitive edge relative to firms 
producing the same or a similar good outside the preferential market. Countries may 
become part of a preferential trade agreement also to insure themselves against the 
erosion of market access caused by other preferential trade agreement of which it is not 
member, especially for small countries seeking access to larger more developed 
markets.166 Indeed, this seems to explain the current proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements between large and developed countries and (a group of) smaller less 
developed countries, whereby the latter are willing to give significant concessions to get 
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market access to the former.167 This is particularly observed in those developing 
countries that are about to lose or have lost developing country preference schemes such 
as the generalized system of preference, GSP.168 For preferential trade agreements 
among small countries, its rationale can be to increase bargaining power in international 
trade negotiation. The creation of such a preferential trade agreement will bring benefits 
through saving of international negotiation costs and giving small countries a larger 
voice international arena, provided that they have similar products as exports and thus 
being able to find a common negotiation position.169 A preferential trade agreement 
can also serve a protectionist rationale, when it enhances the profits of well-organised, 
usually globally uncompetitive but competitive in the preferential area. In this case, 
preferential trade agreements enable the member countries to reap gains from trade in 
product areas where they cannot compete internationally. 
 
 Having observed the progress that can be made in difficult and time-consuming 
WTO negotiations, countries may wish to go deeper in integrating their economy that 
seems possible in the WTO multilateral framework. Preferential trade agreements 
enable government to negotiate on other issues untouched by the WTO, such as 
investment, competition, environment and labour standards, and harmonisation of 
economic policies and rules. Government can highlight preferential trade agreements’ 
role in the new issues and set them as agenda of the multilateral negotiations, for 
example NAFTA provisions for liberalisation of investment measures was employed as 
stepping stone towards the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
in the WTO.170 Furthermore, transaction costs associated with trade negotiations in the 
WTO are likely to be higher than negotiations with fewer participants who in many 
cases share comparable culture, business practice and similar legal system.171 
Preferential trade agreements as intra-state signalling device may help a government 
pursue particular economic policy more effectively and credibly than the WTO regime, 
if they provide for credible and effective enforcement mechanisms. Also the security 
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related benefits of trade agreements can be a significant rationale for preferential trade 
agreements, especially between neighbouring countries, as they can make conflicts 
more costly and favour cross-border collaboration, but also for larger countries to create 
economic dependence. 
 
 It should be recalled that the MFN creates free-rider problem which reduces the 
extent of trade liberalisation, because countries will be reluctant to offer concessions. 
Preferential trade agreements as relaxation of the MFN obligation permit countries to 
overcome this problem. A country cannot now hope for others to induce concession 
from a trading partner, and is now willing to offer its own concession. The trading 
partner having observed that the concession given to the country can be enjoyed only by 
this country, and is not worried in losing bargaining chip in negotiations with other 
countries and refrain from foot-dragging behaviour. Both may conclude a bilaterally 
optimal trade deal. In a situation in which free-rider effects of the MFN seriously impair 
WTO members from liberalisation, a preferential trade agreement may be second-best 
alternative, at least for its signatories. 
 
From global perspective, the critical points of controversy between preferential 
trade agreements and the WTO multilateral regime are the net effect on global welfare 
and WTO members not party to preferential trade agreements, and whether preferential 
trade agreement contribute to the advancement towards the ultimate efficiency 
embodied in multilateral free trade or detract from it. The following discussion focuses 
on the situation in which preferential trade agreements and the WTO multilateral regime 
characterised by the MFN coexist. According to the previous discussion, the MFN 
reduces transaction costs in international trade, increases global welfare of trade deals 
by accelerating liberalisation process towards global free trade and by forging efficient 
resource allocation and increasing specialisation and exports. What are preferential 
trade agreements’ effects on transaction costs in global international trade? What would 
happen to resource allocation, specialisation and trade volume of member and non-
member countries of a preferential trade agreement at its formation? Whether and how 
preferential trade agreements stabilize the WTO multilateral trading system and 
eventually result in global free trade or fragment the world economy? 
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2.2 Preferential Trade Agreements increase transaction costs in 
trade among WTO members. 
 
To begin with the transaction costs; preferential trade agreements as opposite to 
the MFN are expected to nullify and reverse MFN-induced transaction costs reduction 
and to incur considerable additional costs to economic transactions in the global WTO 
multilateral trading system. Bhagwati (1996) states that ‘spaghetti bowl’, the term used 
to describe the varying tariff structures and regulations as a result of preferential trade 
agreement proliferation that traders encounter and customs officials apply, immensely 
increase transaction costs.172
 
First, the coexistence of preferential trade agreement and the WTO trade regime 
increase legal uncertainty in application, interpretation and adjudication. The legal 
uncertainty emerges by the nature of the law. Preferential trade agreements are 
considered international treaty according to the definition given by Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT).173 It is possible to understand relationship 
between WTO agreements and preferential trade agreements however not only as 
between treaties, but also as between different sources of law. Giving other countries 
preferential treatment in form of preferential trade agreement is a right of or freedom for 
state, and have existed long before the advent of the GATT or the WTO, and hence can 
also be considered as customary international law.174 Regardless of character of their 
relations, preferential trade agreements and WTO agreements are of equal rank. 
Although the Singapore Ministerial Conference ‘reaffirms the primacy of the 
multilateral trading system, which includes a framework for the development of 
regional trade agreements, and we renew our commitment to ensure that regional trade 
agreements are complementary to it and consistent with its rules.’,175 the question as to 
which international treaties, WTO agreements and preferential trade agreements, should 
have primacy remains a source of conflict, remains and significantly causes legal 
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uncertainty.176 Legal uncertainty also arises due to the conflicting legal obligation. 
Preferential trade agreements are increasingly likely to include obligations that conflict 
with WTO provisions. While the issue of state responsibility for unlawful acts are 
regulated to a certain degree177, the legal uncertainty due to conflicting legal obligation 
may arise with regards to choice of law and choice of legal forum: May WTO law be 
applied in dispute settlement set by a preferential trade agreement?; May preferential 
trade agreement be applied in the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms?; May a 
claimant bring identical or similar claims in more than one forum at a time, such as at 
the WTO and the forum provided for in preferential trade agreement?; How do these 
divergent sources of law influence one another in terms of interpretation. No clear 
answer is provided to these questions.178
 
Second, the coexistence increases complexity of legal obligation, undermines 
transparency of world trading regime and create administrative and monitoring costs. 
The Proliferation of preferential trade agreements leads to large numbers of different 
tariff rates and other complex regulations. The parallel existence in a single country of 
differing trade rules applying to different trade partners represents a barrier to trade for 
firms and governments not only because of the costs involved in searching, gathering, 
meeting, administering, evaluating and monitoring a wide range of conditions of trade 
rules, but also because it reduces the clarity of the WTO regime.179 This is particularly 
the case for free trade areas which unlike customs union does not adopt a common set of 
trade measures with respect to non-members and where tariff rates and regulations of 
each member country remain. The most prominent example of rule complexity is the 
Rules of Origin in free trade areas, as discussed in section D of this thesis. 
 
2.3 Static effects of preferential trade agreements: trade diversion as 
sources of inefficiencies 
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Preferential trade agreements have effects on trade volume and the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Two important terms are essential in order to answer whether 
preferential trade agreements contribute to trade growth and efficient resource 
allocation: trade creation and trade diversion. 
 
Jacob Viner (1950) first introduces the concepts of trade creation and trade 
diversion in the economic analysis of preferential trade agreements. He defines trade 
creation as the displacement of domestic production by imports from other 
members of a preferential trade agreement. This is economically desirable, since 
production shifts from costly domestic producers to more competitive producers in 
another country. Trade diversion was the shift in the source of imports from a 
cheaper non-member to a higher-cost producer in a member country, which is 
economically undesirable because the production is substituted from low-cost to high-
cost country.180 Trade creation is a phenomenon between members and trade diversion 
between members and non-members of a preferential trade agreement. According to this 
definition, trade creation (between members) certainly occurs upon the formation of a 
preferential trade agreement, because trade barriers are eliminated among members. The 
crucial question is, however, about the source of the increased trade. If it is diverted 
from a competitive non-member producer, then trade diversion arises. The extent of 
trade creation and diversion determine welfare changes, and also their sources, for both 
member and non-member of a preferential trade agreement. The global welfare effects 
can be analysed in by summing up the welfare effects for member countries and those 
for non-members. 
 
Trade creation, trade diversion and welfare effects in member countries of 
preferential trade agreements 
 
For member countries, the welfare effect is ambiguous if the preferential trade 
agreement diverts some trade from outside to inside the agreement area. In comparison 
with before its formation, the welfare may have gone down, up or remained the same. 
Even in the presence of trade diversion, the welfare of member countries might increase 
once the impact of trade creation on consumer surplus is taken into account. In the 
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partial equilibrium model of Johnson (1960) with three countries: home (H), partner (P) 
and rest of the world (W), where H does not have market power and forms a preferential 
trade agreement with P who is a globally inefficient producer of a good compare with 
W. The trade diversion effect takes place, as P has become supplier of this good for H 
instead of the more-competitive W. The trade creation effect takes place between H and 
P, as the increased imports to H are from more competitive P, corresponding to the 
expectation that the reduction of trade barriers within the preferential trade agreement 
area will stimulate trade in the area, so trade among the members is bound to increase. It 
can be shown that the welfare increase for the trade creation effect (area F and G in the 
graphic 1) can be larger than welfare loss from the trade diversion effect. (area E in the 
graphic 1), so that the overall welfare effect for member countries is positive. 
 
In the graphic 1, the horizontal axis represents the quantity, the vertical axis the 
price of a traded good. Home’s supply is represented by SH, Home’s demand by DH. 
The autarky home price, PH, is higher than the price in the country P under the MFN, PP. 
Being an globally inefficient producer, PP is higher than the price of the globally most 
competitive producer, which is the world price, PW. Without the discrimination in 
favour of P, home country will have to import at PW(1+τ), where τ is the MFN ad 
valorem applied tariff rate for the good. The imports is necessary because at PW(1+ τ), 
home country demands QH but produces only at YH. The total welfare under the MFN is 
computed as consumer surplus (area A) + producer surplus (area B and C) + tariff 
revenue (area D and E). As soon as home forms a preferential trade agreement with P 
abolishing all trade barriers between them, the good produced in P can be imported to H 
at the price PP instead of PP(1+ τ). If PP is lower than PW(1+τ), then home will import 
from P at PP instead of from the globally most competitive producer, thus causing trade 
diversion. In this situation, since the import price for home country decreases, the 
domestic demand increases to Q*H, while the domestic supply decreases to Y*H, thus 
making the imports under discrimination larger than the import under MFN. In other 
words, domestic production of H is replaced by imports from P, resulting in trade 
creation. Home country’s welfare is computed as consumer surplus (area A, B, D, F and 
G) + producer surplus (area C). Its welfare level depends on the gain (area F and G) and 
the loss (area E). If area F and G together is smaller than area E, home country 
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experiences welfare loss, from a trade economic point of view, following the formation 
of a preferential trade agreement.181
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Graphic 1: Welfare effect of Home country (H) at the formation of a trade-diverting 
preferential trade agreement.182
However, if a preferential trade agreement purely increases trade among 
members without diverting trade from outside, thus leading to further substitution of 
domestic production by imports from other globally competitive members of the 
preferential trade agreement, the welfare effects is clearly positive. In this case, there is 
only trade creation and no trade diversion. 
 
There is a general tendency to overestimate the trade creation effects. The 
suggested model deals only with tariff barriers, while in reality a preferential trade 
agreement might not eliminate all other trade restrictions within the agreement area, and 
these can still be used by a member country as disguise protectionist measures against 
                                                 
181 Johnson, H. (1960) ‘The economic theory of customs union’, Pakistan Economic Journal 10, 1, pp. 
14-32. 
182 Ibid., with some modifications. 
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other members, thus preventing the effective trade liberalisation and impairing and its 
potential benefits. An example is rules of origin which are necessary in a free trade area 
to prevent imports from non-member being routed through the member country with the 
lowest external tariffs. Even when tariff barriers among members of a preferential trade 
agreement are eliminated, the rules may encompass the content requirement could be so 
configured that an industry actually receives a greater protection than before the 
preferential trade agreement.183 The rules of origin may prescribe the import of 
intermediaries used to produce a final good from an inefficient producer within the 
agreement area in order for the final good to be qualified for preferential treatments. 
This does not only lead to trade diversion from efficient outsiders to inefficient insiders. 
In many cases, the price of the intermediaries the producers of the final good pay is 
higher than imports from outside. This reduces welfare gains from the preferential trade 
agreement for its members. 
 
Although it is clear that the trade diversion effect caused by preferential trade 
agreements is a source of inefficiencies for the member countries and trade creation 
effects can be reduced, it is reasonable to assume that the net welfare effects for the 
member countries should be positive, especially when non-economic elements of states’ 
utility function are taken into account. Otherwise they would not form the preferential 
trade agreement at first place. 
 
Trade creation, trade diversion and welfare effects in non-member 
countries 
 
In contrast to the case of its members, the formation of a preferential trade 
agreement is highly likely to come at the expense of at least some non-members who 
lose out from trade diversion and for the resulting deterioration of their terms of trade, 
as the member countries have discriminate those goods that they can produced at a 
lower costs compared with non-members as well as those they cannot.  
 
If the member countries decide to remove trade barriers of goods they can 
produce at lower costs than world market, member countries will gain from trade 
creation effect while leaving non-members at least unaffected in short-term, by not 
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causing trade diversion. In this case, the preferential trade agreement leads to 
exploitation of economic of scale by the members in a longer term and further 
specialisation which will result in more efficient resource allocation also at global level, 
and improvement of the terms of trade of non-members who can now import the good at 
a lower price. This specialisation will subsequently also lead to expansion of trade at 
global level. A preferential trade agreement that largely entails trade-creating effects 
tends to increase welfare of both members and non-members.  
 
If, however, member countries remove trade barriers of less-competitive goods, 
such that trade is diverted from more competitive non-member countries to the 
agreement area, the net welfare for members might still increase as discussed earlier, 
but non-members will definitely lose their export market. Moreover, the trade diverting 
effects of a preferential trade agreement induced expansion of trade within the 
agreement area may lead to such a decline in demand for exports of non-members that 
the price of these exports decline in world market.   
 
To sum up, preferential trade agreements that create trade diversion have a 
negative welfare effects on non-members, and, given the probably positive welfare 
effects on its members, an ambiguous global welfare effects. The latter is, however, 
likely to be negative, since the trade creation is usually overestimated. In contrast, 
preferential trade agreements that does not create trade diversion is for members and 
non-members and thus globally welfare enhancing. The next step, different 
configurations of preferential trade agreement that give rise to trade diversion will be 
discussed. 
 
Configurations of preferential trade agreement and trade diversion 
 
First, how much a preferential trade agreement is trade-creating or trade-
diverting depends on the choice as to which sectors are to be liberalised. It is possible 
for member countries to exchange market access concession only for globally less-
competitive but regionally competitive products, thus causing trade diversion, with the 
consequence of non-members suffering from considerable decrease export volume and 
deteriorated terms of trade and the global welfare effect is negative. This is particularly 
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true for developing countries that wish to strategically build up key industries, and for 
both developing and developed countries that try to protect inefficient economic sectors. 
 
Second, upon the formation a customs union, member countries, in addition to 
trade liberalisation among each other, adopt a common external tariff and other trade 
regulations. The original trade barriers between a non-member and the member 
countries could be higher or lower than the newly adopted common trade barriers. The 
common tariffs apply to all WTO non-members due to the MFN. If for the non-member 
exporting a good the custom union formation results overall in a higher trade barrier on 
that good, it may lose the export market to other more competitive non-members. The 
custom union’s external tariff can be raised so high that the production is shifted to the 
most internally competitive, globally less-competitive member of the customs union, 
thus reducing trade with the rest of world in a trade diversion manner. The external 
tariff choice thus determines the incidence of trade diversion. Under some conditions it 
is possible to increase welfare of the members without changing the welfare of non-
members; that is leaving the volume of trade between the non-members and the 
members unchanged, meaning that there is no trade diversion. The so-called Kemp-Wan 
Theorem starts from the fact that some members of the customs union were net 
exporters in some products and net importers in other products towards non-members. 
While the removal of trade barriers between the members similar to the formation of a 
free trade area will lead to trade diversions at the expense of non-members, the common 
external tariff can be adjusted such that for each product the customs union’s trade with 
the rest of the world remains unchanged.184  
 
Empirical studies show ambiguous effects of preferential trade agreements 
concerning trade creation and trade diversion, not least because they are complicated by 
the fact that preferential trade agreements are nowadays overlapping. Most of the 
analyses suggest that preferential trade agreements do not offer strong evidence of trade 
creation.185 Even if a preferential trade agreement has a net trade creation effects, there 
will still be non-member losers from the trade deal. For instance, whereas Chang and 
Winters (2001) suggest a term of trade deterioration of regional non-MERCOSUR 
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members,186 Cernat (2001) and Gosh and Yamarik (2004) find that the MERCOSUR 
has a net trade creation effect.187 Clarete et al.(2002) in their study of the effects of 11 
trading blocs within the bloc and with the rest of the world in the 1980s and 1990s state 
that 6 studied blocs mainly of smaller trade agreements, such as the South Pacific 
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation (SPARTECA), the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA), the Andean Community of Nations, trade creation is at expense of the 
non-members. Among the larger blocs, while the EU did not feature trade diverting 
character, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) are strongly trade diverting.188 In contrast, Soloaga and Winters 
(1999) point out that the EU and EFTA is significantly trade diverting while all other 
studied preferential trade agreements are neither trade creating nor diverting.189
 
Third, an important feature of free trade areas and customs unions is that they 
are typically completed in a gradual manner. Trade policy changes associated with a 
preferential trade agreement are phased in. The European Community customs union for 
example needed 12 years after the conclusion to be fully implemented.190 The parties 
to the preferential trade agreement have the opportunity to determine the timeline of the 
implementation. Therefore it is possible that the earlier phasing-in measures are more 
trade-diverting to non-members than the others, and that the implementation period 
extends over too long a period of time. Without a regulation on implementation 
schedule, preferential trade agreements thus may potentially be detrimental to the global 
welfare. 
 
At this stage, it has to be remarked that several factors determine the trade 
diversion effect of preferential trade agreements. Lipsey (1960) suggests that a 
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preferential trade agreement is more likely to be more welfare enhancing (less trade 
diverting) the higher the proportion of trade among the member and the lower the 
proportion with the outside world.191 A preferential trade agreement between ‘natural 
trading partners’, or countries which are expected to conduct disproportionately 
intensive trade due to geographical situation or low transport costs, tends to be less trade 
diverting. Neither the initial MFN tariff level nor the trade volume prior to the 
formation of a preferential trade agreement can be influenced by the GATT Article 
XXIV, which regulates rights and obligation of the WTO members. 
 
2.4 Dynamic effects of preferential trade agreements: preferential 
trade agreements as ‘stumbling blocs’ for the WTO multilateral 
regime 
  
 While static approach looks at the short-to-medium-term welfare effects of 
preferential trade agreements on the WTO members, the ‘dynamic’ approach focuses on 
the the influence the agreements have on the process of gradual WTO multilateral trade 
liberalisation. 
 
 Preferential trade agreements are efficiency-enhancing for the global trade if it 
accelerates the process towards global free trade. The preferential trade agreements will 
be discussed in the light of the question as whether they are ‘building blocs’ to the 
WTO multilateral trade regime in the sense that they help the regime move forward 
towards the global free trade, or whether they are ‘stumbling blocs’ which would 
eventually impede the process and cause the WTO regime to collapse.192 The 
circumstances that turn preferential trade agreements to become stumbling blogs, thus 
causing inefficiencies to the system, should be identified for the further discussion. 
 
 Generally, the formation of a preferential trade agreement can result both in 
further multilateral liberalisation (building bloc) and in proliferation of more 
preferential trade agreements, which can ultimately be building or stumbling blocs. 
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Preferential trade agreements may increase the pressure to act in the direction of further 
multilateral liberalisation for all. Since for the members, they de facto erode existing 
multilateral preference under the MFN, they increase support for further multilateral 
liberalisation. For the non-member countries, since they reduce the competitiveness 
margin relative to the members, these countries’ incentive to move on the multilateral 
front to regain competitiveness margin will increase. Before the full implementation of 
a preferential trade agreement but after the announcement, non-members competitive 
countries who expect their export be diverted to the agreement area will also have the 
incentives to enter multilateral negotiations for further liberalisation in order to 
minimize the possible trade diversion.193 For a customs union, the announcement of its 
formation increases, non-members’ willingness to cooperate with the member-to-be at 
multilateral level may also increase, as upon the formation of a new trade bloc its  
members will have greater bargaining power in trade negotiations and ultimately in 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Further multilateral liberalisation will helps non-
members reduce risks and costs of future trade disputes as well as avoid difficult and 
costly future negotiations.194 However, countries do not necessary response to 
preferential trade agreement formation only by advancing trade multilateralism. They 
can alternatively embark on negotiations for additional preferential trade agreements to 
reach these aims, leading to their further proliferation. The formation of a preferential 
trade agreement increase pressures for further liberalisation, which can be within or 
outside the WTO regime, or both at the same time. More important is the fact that the 
economic characteristics of preferential trade agreements determine their role regarding 
moving towards global free trade. 
 
 Whether preferential trade agreements work as building blocs or stumbling blocs 
depends significantly but not exclusively on whether they are more trade-creating or 
trade-diverting: trade-creating preferential trade agreements are likely to be building 
blocs, trade-diverting stumbling blocs. It is important to note there are many other 
channels through which a preferential trade agreement can be building or stumbling 
bloc.  
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 To begin with the argument that trade-creating preferential trade agreements 
tend to be building bloc, Baldwin (2006) has made this argument relying on the 
interaction between the ‘domino’ theory of preferential trade agreement and the 
‘juggernaut’ theory.195 The domino theory departs from a political economy 
equilibrium that balances pro-membership and anti-membership forces in the presence 
of a preferential trade agreement to which the country is not member. The former force 
is usually associated with industries exporting to the preferential trade agreement area, 
the latter with import-competing industries. Given an expansion of the preferential trade 
agreement area or the formation of a new preferential trade agreement, the pro-
membership industries suffering from disadvantage as being producer outside the 
preferential area exporting into the area will become more active in lobbying for joining 
the preferential trade agreement, and the domestic political economy equilibrium will be 
shifted to the pro-membership group and the country will eventually join the 
preferential trade agreement. This will consequently heighten the pro-membership 
political economy forces in other non-member countries, leading to proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements. The ‘domino can start the juggernaut rolling’, if the 
preferential trade agreement is trade-creating, since such an agreement implies that in 
the preferential area the exporting sectors will expand and importing sectors will shrink 
compared with earlier. The trade-creating effects of preferential trade agreement ensures 
that when another round of multilateral reciprocal negotiations is launched, the pro-
liberalisation industries will be stronger than the anti-liberalisation ones, since the 
former will favour also multilateral liberalisation.196 In contrast, if a preferential trade 
agreement is trade-diverting, that is aiming at protecting import-sectors against more 
competitive non-members; the shift in political economic equilibrium after the 
formation will be in disfavour of multilateral negotiations, since there will be stronger 
lobbying against future multilateral liberalisation to protect the privilege gained at the 
formation of the preferential trade agreement, and since the expected loss from such 
liberalisation becomes higher compared with the situation before the formation of the 
preferential trade agreement.  Trade-diverting preferential trade agreements thus 
critically impede multilateral trade liberalisation.197
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 In contrast to the precedent argument, Ethier (1998) suggests that an originally 
trade-diverting preferential trade agreement does not necessarily work as stumbling blog 
in a longer term, especially in the case when such an agreement is concluded between 
smaller developing and larger developed countries and does not aim at protecting 
inefficient importing industries, but rather at smaller countries exploiting lower costs of 
production through economies of scale in particular sectors. It is likely to attract foreign 
investment and shifts political balance towards necessary economic reforms in these 
sectors, so that they eventually become globally competitive and a force for multilateral 
liberalisation long-term.198
 
 As mentioned earlier, trade creation and trade diversion are not the sole 
determinants of preferential trade agreements being building or stumbling blocs. On the 
building bloc side, Trachtman (2007) stresses the role of preferential trade agreements 
as laboratories for international cooperation and the necessary instrument to mobilise 
public support for multilateral trade liberalisation. Preferential trade agreements further 
can work as pathfinder for multilateral disciplines and predetermine multilateral 
negotiation direction.199  
 
On the stumbling bloc side, although countries might response to the formation 
of preferential trade agreements by forging multilateralism, preferential trade 
agreements are preferred in order to regain competitiveness and secure further market 
access as compensation for diverted trade. In reality of tedious WTO multilateral 
negotiations, an additional preferential trade agreement tends to accelerate the 
proliferation of other preferential trade agreements and slow down multilateral trade 
negotiation for several reasons. First, every preferential trade agreement erodes the 
MFN multilateral concessions. With the possibility of concluding a preferential trade 
agreement in mind, all WTO member know that the WTO concessions can be eroded 
anytime, they have less incentives in concluding multilateral deals and turn to new 
preferential trade agreements to secure benefit they have lost as non-member of existing 
agreements. Second, preferential trade agreements are often preferred as best alternative 
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to a negotiated multilateral agreement200 that cannot be reached within a desired period 
of time. Non-member countries try to enhance their leverage in multilateral negotiations 
by strategically cultivating preferential trade agreements.201 Given the fact that the 
WTO multilateral negotiations since its formation in 1995 have been increasingly time-
consuming, involving many parties and thematically complex and controversial, 
preferential trade agreements proliferate at such a high speed that the world trade now is 
dominated by a complex web of trade agreements and trade blocs which in turn 
mutually block progress at multilateral negotiation level. Third, the large number of 
preferential trade agreement negotiations a country engages in crowd-out the resource 
available and enthusiasm for multilateral negotiations.  
 
Preferential trade agreements become stumbling bloc to WTO trade regime not 
only because they gravely slow down multilateral negotiations, but also because they 
can potentially cause the breakdown of the whole system. That is because, first, 
preferential trade agreements sometimes stipulate alternative regulatory structure and 
standards including dispute settlement mechanisms that are incompatible with the WTO 
rules, thus increasing non-transparency, unpredictability and weakening the 
enforcement of the WTO rules.202 Second, they represent the ‘spaghetti bowl’ that 
increase transaction costs in trade. Third, trade organised in trade blocs with high 
bargaining power combined with weak WTO rule enforcement may result in tensions 
and retaliation and chain reactions in the event of a dispute.203
 
Direct systematic empirical evidence of building and stumbling bloc effects of 
preferential trade agreements is very limited, because theoretical literature focuses on 
whether the formation of preferential trade agreements reduces or not the incentives to 
sign a free trade multilateral agreement, although in reality negotiate for more or less 
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ambitious multilateral agreement rather than opting between yes and no.204 
Nevertheless, some studies have highlighted robust positive correlation between the 
presence of preferential trade agreements and multilateral tariff level and support the 
view that preferential trade agreements may work as stumbling bloc, especially in case 
of large preferential trade agreements, such as the EC and NAFTA.205 Nevertheless 
there are studies that find evidence for concrete multilateralism-enhancing role of 
preferential trade agreements. For example, Winters (1996) points that the formation of 
the European Economic Community led directly to the Dillon and Kennedy Round, so 
did the prospect of APEC to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.206
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
 To conclude this part, preferential trade agreements are under some conditions 
detrimental to global welfare as well as to the welfare of non-members. The preceding 
paragraphs have discussed the possibility of the negative effects in such a manner that 
would facilitate the analysis of the article. They do not present an exhaustive and 
comprehensive list of circumstances under which preferential trade agreements are 
incompatible with the WTO trade community objectives. It also has to be noted that 
even if those detrimental effects are often associated with trade diversion and increased 
transaction costs of international trade, there exist other channels through which 
preferential trade agreements impede the realisation of optimal global welfare.  Other 
negative effects of preferential trade agreements and backdrops of WTO trade regime 
are not covered in the scope of the Article: for instance, the WTO cannot prescribe 
member countries a road map of multilateral trade negotiations. Even the objective of 
global optimal welfare realized by global non-discriminatory free trade regime is purely 
hypothetical and serves as benchmark for analysis. Also some aspects of preferential 
trade agreement discussed earlier is dealt with by other provisions: for instance, the 
GATT Article XXIII (nullification and impairment) tackles the concession-erosion 
effects of preferential trade agreements. 
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To provide a basis of an agreement regulating discrimination, i.e. GATT Article 
XXIV, the WTO members, first, have to believe that the gains to countries who benefits 
from unregulated discrimination are systematically less than the loss to those who suffer 
from unregulated discrimination, that is the presence of preferential trade agreements 
inflicts upon the global trade community a net loss. Second, the WTO must provide for 
the regulations that either effectively ban the discrimination or effectively ensure that 
the regulated discrimination makes the gains become higher than the loss or and that no 
loss incurs to any signatory at the event of preferential trade agreement formation, or at 
least that the net loss is lower than without the regulations. The ‘task’ for an efficiency-
enhancing WTO legal institution dealing with preferential trade agreements must 
therefore prescribe adequate configuration of preferential trade agreements in order to 
ensure that the global welfare effects is positive upon their formation by 1) limiting the 
possible welfare loss associated with trade diversion for non-members, including the 
‘stumbling bloc’ effects. This loss originated in the undesirable changes of the elements 
of the state utility function: trade volume, efficiency of resource allocation and terms of 
trade. The legal institution should therefore shape states’ ‘property rights’ in order to 
minimize trade diversion; 2) by increasing gains for members and non-members 
through securing the trade creation effect. Furthermore, since non-members suffer some 
loss, the legal institution also has to ensure that 3) the non-members are entitle to 
compensation for the loss. Last but not least, it should also 4) reduce transaction costs 
that arise in presence of preferential trade agreements. In the next part, the discussion 
will focus on whether the GATT Article XXIV effectively fulfils these tasks. 
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H. Efficiency effects of Article XXIV 
 
1. General remarks 
 
One conclusion drawn from the precedent part of the thesis is that preferential 
trade agreements are not always detrimental to global welfare: with some characteristics 
they can be an advancement of the multilateral trade regime and enhance aggregate 
WTO members’ welfare; but they can also pose damages to the world trade system and 
reduce welfare of some WTO members that are not parties to them, and thus potentially 
the total welfare. Therefore, they are not a pareto welfare improvement for the whole 
WTO trade community. Whether preferential trade agreements are desirable from the 
perspective of the WTO trade regime, they have existed long before the foundation of 
GATT in 1947 in various forms, unregulated, and they are there to remain coexisting 
with the later developed GATT/WTO regime and likely to spread. 
 
At the time of negotiations, the Article XXIV was one of the main controversial 
issues. The discussion that would lead to the Article as it is was shaped by the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had the vision 
of strong definition of non-discrimination and was willing to permit only preferential 
trade agreements with ‘100% preference’, meaning completely free trade between its 
members, as only this – consistent with the later found effect of trade creation – ‘can 
create wider trading area, removes obstacles to competition, makes possible a more 
economic allocation of resources and thus operates to increase production and raise 
planes of living’. The US position was strongly in favour of transparency and 
predictability of preferential trade agreements within a strong multilateral trade regime, 
having in mind the picture of the break-out of preferential trade agreement in the 1930s, 
which had led the world to the fragmented and discriminatory bilateralism. The US 
believed that the conditions set upon the formation by the Article should prevent this 
situation. The UK wanted to retain its Imperial Preferential System with less than 100% 
preference, meaning that there are still some internal barriers. The Article, especially 
Article XXIV: 8, was a compromise between both positions.207
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The history of the negotiation process combined with the fact that preferential 
trade agreements had long existed before GATT confirmed that the 23 signatories of the 
GATT in October 1947 conceived the GATT to be complimentary to the existing 
preferential trade agreements. The consequence is that the Article XXIV as it was 
formulated in 1947 was intended to make sure that the then newly created GATT posed 
no constraints to or necessitated any modification of the existing preferential trade 
agreements. That does not mean that the efficiency analysis of the Article is 
meaningless, since the world trade pattern and the nature of the multilateral trade regime 
have ever since continuously undergone fundamental changes. 
 
In 1947, nobody expected the development of the WTO or the GATT to be 
universal and evolving into an international organ that globally governs international 
trade through legally binding liberalisation and regulations, regular implementation 
review mechanism and, most importantly, internationally recognized decisions. 
Although the WTO cannot be regarded as supra-national organisation, it comes to be an 
approximation of the concept of global governance by means of countries allocating 
their sovereignty and rights to it. The 125 WTO founding members in 1994 and more 
significantly the subsequent ascension of large trading nations such as China, Turkey 
and Switzerland as well as other economies in transitions, has advanced its status to an 
undisputed universal trade community, in which its members are entitled to demand for 
the insurance that any action of some members do not harm the interests of other 
community members. The primacy of the WTO regime is implicitly recognized. The 
concept of the Article XXIV regime has shifted from being an inactive bystander of the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements to actively shaping the characteristics of 
preferential trade agreements by setting and applying rules for the latter to comply with 
the WTO regime, as demonstrated with the adaptation of an effective WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism but also the Understanding208 and reflected in the rulings of the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies in these regards. The WTO trade regime at least in its 
legal provisions has thus become a consensus upon which almost all trading nations 
agree to conduct commercial relations, without evolving as supra-national institution 
legally subordinating other international trade-related institutions. The efficiency 
analysis is therefore absolutely meaningful and desirable in the interests of the whole 
WTO trade community. As mentioned in section D, the Article does not aim at 
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prohibiting preferential trade agreements but, in recognition of their economic benefits, 
but rather at shaping them so that to globally become maximally beneficial, minimally 
damaging and compatible with the objectives of WTO, since they cause externalities 
that can lead to net loss of the whole trade community. 
 
This part examines the provisions of the Article, their interpretation and 
application by various WTO organs in relation to the identified negative externalities of 
preferential trade agreements to the WTO trade regime, and that to the extent to which 
these externalities are tackled by the Article, since not all of them are dealt with by the 
Article. The discussion is limited to Article XXIV: 5, 6, 7 and 8, corresponding to the 
fact that the Understanding has clearly emphasized the absolute necessity of compliance 
by stating that ‘Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the 
formation of a customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, 
must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.’209 
Proceeding from each paragraph to another, it will discuss whether and how the Article 
regulates states’ behaviours in connection with the formation of preferential trade 
agreements, so that these behaviours yield desirable global welfare effects. It also 
discusses the backdrops of the Article due to which the Article’s welfare-maximizing 
effects are impaired, and presents improvement suggestions under discussion. The 
findings in the part will finally give the answer to one of the main questions as whether 
Article XXIV helps improve the global welfare of the WTO trade community with the 
presence of preferential trade agreements in comparison with the same situation but 
without it. 
 
2. Article XXIV: 8 
 
 For the purpose of further elaborations, it should be recalled that the Article 
XXIV: 8 stipulates the definition of customs union (Article XXIV: 8(a)) and free-trade 
area (Article XXIV: 8(b)), whereby Article XXIV: 8(b) is in effect identical with Article 
XXIV: 8(a)(i) in requiring that duties and other restrictive regulations with some 
exceptions between members of a custom union and a free-trade area must be 
eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between them. Article XXIV: 8(a)(ii) 
additionally defines a customs union as having substantially the same duties and other 
                                                 
209 Ibid. 
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regulations towards non-members of the union.210 Together with the paragraph 1 of 
the Understanding, the definitions set in Article XXIV: 8 become conditions for 
preferential trade agreements to be satisfied in order to be qualified as WTO-compatible 
preferential trade agreements.211 Article XXIV: 8 affects both members and non-
members and has primarily the overall welfare objective. The focus of the analysis is 
given to the provision ‘substantially all’ and (elimination of) ‘other restrictive 
regulations’, since both concern the externalities of preferential trade agreement on the 
WTO trade regime. 
 
2.1 ‘Substantially all’ 
 
Rationale 
 
 The ‘substantially all’ requirement plays a very significant role in increasing the 
trade-creating effects of a preferential trade agreement. Its rationale is based on the 
observation that in almost all cases, countries that conclude a preferential trade 
agreement usually import some goods and while export some goods to other parties to 
the agreement, but also to third countries. Accordingly the countries are globally 
competitive in producing some goods and are already exporter before the formation. 
Through the requirement that substantially all trade between the constituent members is 
to be liberalised upon the formation of a preferential trade agreement, it is highly 
probable that the trade in goods in the production of which the parties to the agreement 
are already globally competitive and exporting is liberalised, thus leading to trade 
creation effects without causing trade diversion. The requirement also prevents the 
member countries to exchange concession only in the trade in the goods in the 
production of which they are originally globally uncompetitive, thus potentially 
diverting imports from competitive third countries to uncompetitive countries within the 
agreement area, and thus causing trade diversion. It also helps avoid à la carte 
agreement that exclude broad range or sensitive sectors or include only few sectors.212 
                                                 
210 Article XXIV: 8 
211 Note 2. The Understanding, which entered into force upon the formation of the WTO in 1994, 
strengthens the Article by explicitly stating that preferential trade agreements must satisfy the Article 
XXIV: 5-8. 
212 World Trade Organisation (1995), Regionalism and the World Trade System, Geneva: World Trade 
Organisation, p. 66. 
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Additionally, Schwartz and Syke (1996) state that having to liberalise in an across-the-
board manner, the formation of a preferential trade agreement tends to be preceded by 
an extended period of negotiations, profound debates and publicity which would allow 
economic actors to adjust to the change and increase transparency.213 The requirement 
therefore helps ensure that the net global welfare effect is positive or at least the global 
net loss caused by preferential trade agreements are significantly reduced, by securing 
preferential trade liberalisations in at least some goods that do not lead to trade 
diversion but are predominantly trade creating.  
 
Weakness and improvement under discussion 
 
The weakness of the ‘substantially all’ requirement lies in its vague and 
ambiguous interpretation. The most precise interpretation given is ‘some trade but not 
all trade’ offered by the ruling in the Turkey-Textile case.214 The key problem is the 
lack of a definition of the extent of the requirement and the methods used to measure it. 
There are three types of the approaches under discussion to define the requirement. The 
WTO member countries and WTO organs have yet to decide on these approaches. 
 
First, the ‘substantially all’ provision might require a substantial percentage cut 
off point of tariff rates to a predefined extent for all traded items. A predefined 
reduction rate of 90% would mean that upon a formation of a preferential trade 
agreement, member countries are obliged to reduce the tariff rates by 90% in all tariff 
lines compared with before. This approach enables the Article XXIV: 8 to fulfil its 
rationale, since liberalisation takes place in the trade of all goods. A problem arises, 
however, when non-quantifiable non-tariff barriers of trade are concerned. Upon the 
founding of the WTO in 1994, Australia forwarded this approach and defined 
substantially all as 95% percentage cut. This proposal did not find sufficient support. 
 
Second, the ‘substantially all’ provision might require that a preferential trade 
agreement liberalise tariffs and all other restrictions for goods accounting for a 
substantial part of the trade volume between members constituent to the agreement. 
This approach ensures that liberalisation of any good, once taken place, would be 
                                                 
213 Schwartz and Sykes 1996, pp. 75-6. 
214 Turkey-Textile, paragraph 48; compare with section D 
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complete. The main weakness is the fact that an entire sector can be excluded from 
liberalisation. If the sector is competitive sector, the positive global welfare effects of 
trade creation might thus be forgone.215
 
Third, the ‘substantially all’ provision might be interpreted in terms of sectoral 
coverage of a preferential trade agreement, and require that the elimination of all trade 
barriers cover substantial number of sectors. It does not make sense to define the 
percentage of the number of goods as being ‘substantial’, since an entire sector can still 
be exempted from liberalisation. For this reason, this ‘substantially all’ sectoral 
coverage is understood as no major sector being excluded from the agreement. This 
prompts the question as to which sectors can be considered major sector.  
 
In reality, the evolvement of the third approach as WTO norm is less probable 
than the other approaches due to a large record of contravening state practice. Before 
1994, the sectoral coverage of most preferential trade agreements was narrow. An 
extreme example was the European Coal and Steel Community which covered only 2 
traded items. Even since the WTO establishment, most preferential trade agreements 
continue to omit sensitive sectors such as agriculture and textile. Even though some 
sectors are often excluded, by the tenth year of their implementation, almost all 
preferential trade agreements provide for at least 90%, and even 95% for agreements 
among developed countries, cut of tariff rates across-the-board in average, and cover at 
least 90% of their imports from other members. The state practice corresponds to the 
first and second rather than the third approach.216  
 
Since the choice of these approaches is still being discussed, and no agreement 
has been reached so far, countries continue to interpret and apply the requirement in a 
manner that would best suit their interests, thus often weakening the welfare-enhancing 
effects of Article XXIV: 8. Therefore, a clear provision concerning the extent of 
‘substantially all’ and its measurement is urgently needed as improvement. Given the 
lack of a unified state practice in this regard, the norm improvement is unlikely to be 
derived from WTO dispute settlement bodies rulings, nor from review, complaint and 
notification processes at the conclusion of which the WTO members have the final say. 
                                                 
215 Bhagwati 1991, p. 68. 
216 Dam, Kenneth (1970), The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 290; WTR 07, pp. 309-10. 
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In contrast, the substantive rule improvement is expected to come as a result of 
negotiations in the Doha round (probably in form of an understanding similar to the 
Understanding of 1994), which has included the negotiations on the WTO rules 
including the GATT Article XXIV. The issue of the clarity of ‘substantially all’ 
requirement has been given a priority among rules issues related to preferential trade 
agreements and a negotiation roadmap has been circulated to WTO member since June 
2004.217 In fact, the discussion is a continuation of the debate between the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the 1940s concerning the issue of ‘100% preference’. 
Due to the existing WTO global governance and the proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements, the stake for each position seems to be higher than 65 years ago. The Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration set the end of 2006 as the limit for the completing of the 
negotiation.218 This aim was not reached and so far no progress has been made. 
 
2.2 ‘Other restrictive regulations’ 
 
Rationale 
 
 The requirement of the elimination of ‘other restrictive regulations’ with respect 
to the trade between member countries of a preferential trade agreement should ensure 
that not only tariff barriers are eliminated but also other possible non-tariff barriers. The 
rationale of this provision is as follows. First, if a preferential trade agreement is not 
required to eliminate all other non-tariff trade restrictions, some member countries may 
still find some incentives to introduce these measures as protectionism against other 
members, thus preventing a genuine trade liberalisation and impairing its potential 
benefits from trade creation. Second, as discussed in section G, in absence of this ‘other 
                                                 
217 Negotiating Group on Rules of the World Trade Organisation, Statement by the Chairman in the 
Informal Open-Ended Meeting With Senior Officials on 25 November 2009, TN/RL/W/246 (hereinafter 
TN/RL/W/246), dated 27 November 2009. The document is the latest record summing up the progress 
made in the rules negotiation until the period of thesis writing. The rules negotiations are conduct in the 
Negotiating Group on Rules established by the paragraph 28-9 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (2001), Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted on 14 November 2001, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf, retrieved on 8 August 2009. 
218 Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (2005), Ministerial Declaration (Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration), WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted on 22 December 2005, Internet: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf, retrieved on 19 August 2009, 
Annex D, Section II, paragraph 3. The latest progress in the rules negotiations can be found in the 
Internet: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/rules_e.htm.  
 94
restrictive regulations’, some of the ‘other restrictive measures’ might be incorporated 
into the agreement so as to increase trade among members at the costs of non-members, 
thus giving rise to welfare loss for the latter due to trade diversion. The requirement was 
introduced in order to maximize trade creation effects and prevent possible trade 
diversion. Nevertheless, the Article allows for some exceptions. These exceptions are 
explicitly enumerated and include for instance quantitative restrictions, safeguards of 
balance of payment and other general exceptions. They are permitted only if necessary, 
under strict conditions and for a limited period of time. Further, they must be introduced 
in an non-discriminatory manner to all members of the preferential trade agreement.219
 
Weakness and improvement under discussion 
 
 First, the weakness of the ‘other restrictive regulations’ lies in the fact that the 
aforementioned exceptions can systematically reduce welfare of non-members, 
especially in connection with quotas. As quotas or tariff rate quotas220 are permitted 
within the agreement area, members may provide in addition to the quotas existing 
before the agreement for each other. This leads to an expansion of the overall quota 
entitlements and a subsequent price reduction thus eroding quota rents for and the 
welfare of non-member.221  
 
Second, without clarification of ‘other restrictive measures’ protectionist 
measures against other members of the preferential trade agreement remain possible and 
unregulated. As long as it is not clear what kind of regulations Article prohibits or 
allows apart from the aforementioned exceptions, the exploitation of this unclear 
provision may prevent trade creations and cause trade diversion. The measures other 
than those listed in the Article are in fact implicitly allowed, as the case Argentina – 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear has demonstrated.222 Beside safeguards, 
these measures include for instance antidumping (GATT Article VI), subsidies (Article 
XIV) and rules of origin.  
                                                 
219 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, paragraph 113. 
220 A tariff rate quota specifies the quantity under which the imports cross the border at a low, in many 
cases zero, tariff rates. Imports beyond the quota are taxed at a higher tariff rate.  
221 WTR 07, p. 311. 
222 Note 12, Safeguard Measures was in this case discussed in connection with the GATT Article XIX 
which is not explicitly allowed for in the Article XXIV, and the Agreement on Safeguards which is an 
integral part of GATT 1994 that clarifies the application of the GATT Article XIX. 
 95
 
 The Doha Negotiation Groups on Rule did not include the clarification of ‘other 
restrictive regulations’ requirement into the negotiations, despite the fact that the 
improvement of the Article should involve both aspects of the requirement. That is it 
should be made clear as to which and how far of the non-tariff barriers are allowed 
within a preferential trade agreement with the objective of increasing global welfare. 
Instead of regulating the non-tariff barriers within preferential trade agreements, the 
WTO members rather make progress in disciplining and clarifying non-tariff barriers 
among its members. Since the Uruguay Round, there have been Agreements on 
Safeguards, Antidumping and Subsidies as instruments complementary to their 
respective provisions in the GATT. The Doha Negotiations Groups have been making 
progress with regards to improving the rules concerning antidumping and subsidies.223 
With regards to the rules of origin, in addition to the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
concluded in 1994 as an integral agreement to the GATT 1994, the WTO members is 
working toward harmonizing MFN rules of origin, however, not preferential trade 
agreement rules of origin.224
 
3. Article XXIV: 5 
 
 Article XXIV: 5 is another key provision in the Article, focus on the welfare of 
non-members, and aims to ensure that the formation of a preferential trade agreement 
result in trade barriers to third countries that are ‘not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce’ prior to 
the formation. Article XXIV: 5(a) deals with customs union, and Article XXIV: 5(b), 
with almost identical formulation, with free-trade areas. Regarding the term ‘general 
incidence of duties and regulations’, the Understanding further specifies that for duties, 
general incidence can be calculated as tariff average weighted on customs duty collected 
(weighted average tariff rates), and that case-by-case examination is needed for non-
tariff regulations.225 Furthermore, Article XXIV: 5(c) and the Understanding provide 
for  a reasonable length of time, that is 10 years, with possibility of extension in 
                                                 
223 TN/RL/W/246, pp. 1-8. 
224 Srinivasan, T. N. (1998), Regionalism and the WTO: Is Non-Discrimination Passé?, in Krueger, Anne 
O. (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (hereinafter 
Srinivasan), pp. 345-6. 
225 Understanding, paragraph 2 and 3. 
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exceptional cases, for the completion of the implementation of preferential trade 
agreements. The following elaboration focuses on the two provisions: ‘reasonable 
length of time’ and ‘not on the whole higher or more restrictive than general incidence’. 
 
3.1 ‘Reasonable length of time’ 
 
Rationale 
 
The Rationale for this provision is that every preferential trade agreement needs 
a certain transition period for implementation. During this period economic actors need 
to adjust to new environment by, for instance, investing in new technologies, which are 
likely to cause some costs (adjustment costs). Too short a transition period, firms might 
not be able to finance these investments and the economy of the members could be 
prevented from reaping the highest benefit from the deal. From the perspective of non-
members, transition period should offer sufficient time for economic actors to adjust to 
the new environment, for the government to formulate trade policy response and for the 
WTO to increase transparency by examining the agreement. Nevertheless, trade policy 
changes associated with a preferential trade agreement are phased in. It is possible a 
preferential trade agreement provides for the earlier phasing-in of measures that are 
more trade-diverting to non-members and less trade-creating for the members than the 
measures to be implemented later. Without a clear time limit as implementation 
schedule, such a situation might arise and preferential trade agreements thus may 
potentially be detrimental to the global welfare for an unnecessarily long period. A 
period of ten years was agreed as a reasonable length of transition time, with possibility 
of extension. 
 
Weakness and possible improvement 
 
 Although the ten years of transition period was agreed upon without being 
justified by any economic reason, the practice shows that the implementation of more 
that 90% preferential trade agreements is completed by that period.226 That is 
                                                 
226 By 1994 when the Understanding, which specified the 10 year transition period, was agreed, most 
WTO members had already had some experience with preferential trade agreements. The timeframe 
therefore reflects the highly feasible scenario.  
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particularly due to the fact that most of them do not include agriculture and textile. 
Those agreements that include the sensitive sectors need usually longer time in average, 
sometimes as long as 20 years.227 The weakness of the provision is therefore not the 
seemingly arbitrarily chosen period of 10 years, but rather, first, what constitute 
‘exceptional cases’ to justify the extension of the transition period and how this 
extension is permitted. The members of a preferential trade agreement usually refer to 
the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) for its transition period extension. There is 
however no evaluation guideline for the CTG to examine the case, and the Council 
usually only takes note of most extensions as fait accompli. In fact, this provision does 
in practice make no significant difference on states’ behaviour. The second weak point 
concerns how the pace of liberalisation within the transition period is determined, and 
the constituent members of preferential trade agreements are free to set the speed and 
pace of implementation, such that, for example, for some strategic reasons, a effectively 
trade-diverting import-substituting liberalisation takes place in the early year and most 
of the trade-creating liberalisation concentrate on the very last year of the transition 
period. 
 
 Although it might appear to be necessary to regulate the liberalisation speed and 
pace of the transition in order to enable trade creation right at the beginning of the 
transition period, a rule improvement that involve such a regulation is unlikely to be 
politically optimal, since this would imply an ex-ante examination of a possible 
preferential trade agreement, thus requiring an involvement of countries or organs other 
than the constituent members and causing costs, and gravely limit states’ sovereign 
rights. In contrast, as a rule improvement, a guideline can be established for the CTG to 
examine the transition period extension request. Similarly to the ‘substantially all’ 
provision, the Doha Negotiation Group on Rules has been dealing with the clarification 
of the ‘reasonable length of time’ provision explicitly as a priority issue since 2004. A 
roadmap for negotiations has been agreed upon, without substantial progress being 
made so far.228
 
                                                 
227 WTR 07, pp. 309-10. 
228 TN/RL/W/246, p. 9. 
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3.2 ‘Not on the whole higher or more restrictive than general 
incidence’ 
 
Rationale 
 
For free-trade areas which do no alter the trade barriers with respect to the third 
parties, the application, implementation and observance of the provision ‘not on the 
whole higher or more restrictive’ are a straight-forward matter. Only for customs unions 
which usually change the external barriers, the issue becomes interesting. The rationale 
behind the provision is that the formation of a preferential trade agreement must not 
negatively affect non-members by creating an additional burden, as both tariff and non-
tariff barriers. Higher and more restrictive trade barriers compared with, to use the 
WTO terminology, the general incidence before the formation may result in a situation 
in which the production is shifted from outside to an internally uncompetitive, globally 
less-competitive member of the customs union, thus reducing trade with the rest of 
world in a trade diversion manner. It is also based in the belief that a new barrier not 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence is sufficient to ensure that third 
countries are unaffected by the formation. With regards to the general incidence in tariff 
barriers, its calculation method (weighted tariff average on pre-agreement customs 
duties collected) reflects the focus on tariff revenue as an important determinant of third 
parties’ welfare. Since, according to this method, their tariff revenue should be 
unaltered, they are not affected. The constant tariff revenue is believed to be an 
approximation for a constant trade volume, meaning no trade diversion occurs. 
 
Weakness 
 
With the requirement ‘not on the whole higher or more restrictive than general 
incidence’ in place, the potential negative welfare effects of preferential trade 
agreements on non-members can be reduced. Still, there are many backdrops that cause 
the regulation failure to serve the aim of keeping third parties unaffected. Three main 
weaknesses are found. The first concerns Article XXIV: 5(b) and the welfare effects of 
free-trade areas on third parties. The second concerns the method of calculation of the 
general incidence in tariff barriers in Article XXIV: 5(a). The third concerns the non-
tariff barriers in the same paragraph. 
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As to free-trade areas, recalling that Article XXIV: 8 substantially contributes to 
a positive global welfare effects of a free-trade area, it does not rule out the possibility 
that some of the non-members may lose out from trade diversion. Whereas it is clearly 
measurable whether higher restrictions occur or not, no higher or more restrictive 
regulations do not avert this possible trade diversion. The regulation prevents only 
potential trade diversion that otherwise were caused by higher barriers. If a free-trade 
area is formed in accordance with the Article, and still some third parties suffer from 
free-trade-area-induced trade loss, they have to accept the loss, since there are no further 
regulations as to a compensation for it.229
 
As to the calculation of the general incidence in tariff barriers, clearly there is a 
direct link between the external tariff choice and trade diversion incidence. But 
economic literature suggests that the external tariff choice that keeps the tariff revenue 
of non-members constant after the formation of a preferential trade agreement, as the 
calculation method suggests, cannot prevent trade diversion and thus being unable to 
shield third parties from welfare loss, since this does not ensure a constant trade volume 
with the non-members, and since according to the Kemp-Wan theorem, a sufficient 
condition to prevent the welfare loss is, for each, product to preserve the pre-agreement 
trade volume. In order to be so, the new external tariffs must be lower than the general 
incidence. Nevertheless, the fact that the GATT members were able to agree on the 
calculation method for the general incidence represents a big step to make preferential 
trade agreements less WTO-damaging, because before 1994 as the only legal instrument 
that regulated preferential trade agreements was the Article itself, different customs 
unions used different method of calculation, even in a timely inconsistent manner. For 
example, the European Economic Community and later the European Community used 
arithmetic average for the calculation of new external tariffs upon the enlargement in 
1957, 1973, 1981 and 1986, which effectively resulted in lower trade volume with third 
parties.230  
 
                                                 
229 Finger, J. Michael (1993), ‘GATT’s Influence on Regional Arrangements’, in De Melo, Jaime and 
Arvind Panagariya (eds), New Dimenstions in Regional Integration, Princeton, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 134. 
230 Srinivasan, pp. 344-5; WTR 07, pp. 312, 319-20. 
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As to the non-tariff barriers, since the quantification difficulties may arise, the 
regulations provided for case-by-case examination of other restrictive regulations. The 
ruling of the Appellate Body in the Turkey - Textile case allows for more restrictive, 
thus reversing the provision of the Article, provided they first are necessary for the 
formation, second does not conflict with other GATT provisions and third represent the 
least costly policy options.231 The qualification of the violation of Article XXIV: 5(a) 
has been generally applicable and not only limited to this case. The WTO Appellate 
Body considers the potential welfare enhancing effects of preferential trade agreements 
to be desirable for the whole WTO trade community subjected to three important 
conditions it has set, even if a given prefential trade agreement may entail a clear 
violation of its provisions and welfare loss for non-members. It is believed that the three 
conditions set upon the violation would mean the increased welfare is significantly 
higher than welfare loss suffered by non-members. And since Article XXIV: 6 provides 
for compensatory adjustment, in the end nobody would end up worse off than before. 
Nevertheless, the rule application in fact weakened the rules, thus potentially diluting 
the welfare enhancing effect of the Article, which would be achieved if it were strictly 
implemented. That is because it opens the possibility of trade-diverting protectionist 
external tariffs being legally sanctioned, thereby hoping for equivalent compensation, 
but, as discussed later, the compensatory adjustment for non-members often do not lead 
to equivalent compensation for those affected. Knowing this, countries have more 
incentives to conclude preferential trade agreements that might not be conform to 
Article XXIV: 5 and, facing with the possibility of insufficient compensation, conclude 
further rule-violating preferential trade agreements to improve their welfare position or 
as trade retaliation. Therefore, while the ruling in the case focused on the static welfare 
effects, it may lead to negative welfare effects in short-term and profoundly ‘stumbling’ 
effects in long-term. 
 
Possible improvement under discussion 
 
 With regards to how the rules could be improved, the suggested changes 
generally appear to be either economically desirable yet too radical to be politically 
optimal or technically difficult or unrealistic to be implemented. That might explain 
                                                 
231 Turkey-Textile, paragraphs 58-9, 65; more in detail in Part D. 
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why the Doha Negotiation Group on Rule has not made any progress, even though the 
topic of economic neutrality of preferential trade agreements towards third parties has 
been one of the priorities.232
 
 For both free-trade areas and customs unions to be economically neutral vis-à-
vis non-members, they are likely to lower, both tariff and non-tariff, trade barriers after 
their formation. Most of the suggested rule improvements centre around the issue of 
how much this reduction should be. With regards to customs union, while Bhagwati 
(1993) believes that new tariff rates according to the Kemp-Wan that keep trade volume 
constant could be required from any newly formed customs union, he stated that the 
best way to fully eliminate trade diversion is to oblige a customs union not to set the 
new trade barriers that are higher than the pre-agreement lowest barriers among its 
members. If at least one of the members had a zero pre-customs-union tariff, this 
proposal would imply that such a union will result that a customs union would engage 
in free trade with all non-members. Thus, preferential trade agreements not only are 
exclusively trade creating and welfare enhancing but also automatically become 
‘building blocs’ for multilateral negotiations. Bhagwati’s relatively radical proposal, 
though desirable reform, deters the formation of customs unions. Since countries 
usually form free-trade areas as stepping stone towards customs unions, and since free-
trade areas under the current regulations (Article XXIV: 5(b)) may create some loss 
which is not required to be compensated, this proposal, if it stands alone, might result in 
lower global welfare through potentially keeping economic integration processes only 
to the level of free trade areas. Therefore, either it has to be complemented by 
substantial reduction of external barriers between free-trade area members and non-
members (in order to make members at least indifferent between free-trade area and 
customs union), or the Article must rule out any free-trade area that to remain so and 
allow for only those that will be transformed within a reasonable length of time to a 
customs union according to the proposal.233
 
In line with the Kemp-Wan theorem, McMillan (1993) proposed as a less radical 
improvement that it should be further prescribe that customs union are not allowed to 
introduce policies that result in external trade volume being lowered. This implies that 
                                                 
232 Note 229. 
233 Bhagwati 1993, p. 36 
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trade volumes are to be monitored and analysed in long-term. If after some years a 
customs union reduces its imports from the rest of the world, it is required to adjust its 
trade restriction to reverse the reduction.234 The McMillan proposal simplifies the 
Kemp-Wan theorem which would otherwise require examining the trade with the rest of 
the world in every good.235 The backdrop of this proposal is, however, that the 
changes in aggregate trade volume need not necessarily indicate change in global 
welfare, although it is its better approximation compared with the current method.236
 
 Regardless of whether and under which formula the new customs union’s 
external barriers are lowered, the fact that the transformation of a free-trade area to a 
customs union most probably incurs negative effects for some member countries due to 
common external tariffs that are lower than individual tariffs or due to unilateral 
compensatory adjustments for non-members. Countries have thus less incentives for 
further integration beyond free-trade area. Given that Article XXIV: 6 (discussed later) 
in the case that free-trade areas do not provide for compensatory adjustment for possible 
welfare loss for third countries, customs unions are from this perspective economically 
less preferred than free-trade areas. Irrespective of the discussed proposals concerning 
customs unions, the rule improvement should require from countries forming a free-
trade area the reduction of their individual external barriers to the rest of the world (as 
discussed earlier). Alternatively, the rules may oblige free-trade area members to 
compensations to affected countries. 
 
 The greatest obstacle to agreeing on an improvement proposal that goes beyond 
‘on the whole not higher or more restrictive’ or that potentially or eventually results in 
the obligation to reduce external trade barriers is of political nature. First, the barrier 
reduction has a nature of compensation and therefore does not entail reciprocal 
concession from third parties, as it aims at restoring the pre-agreement welfare level or 
trade volume. Countries would have no motivation to offer unilateral concession. 
Especially as they have to do so to all other WTO members based on the MFN 
principle, including those with whom they expect difficult multilateral negotiations, 
                                                 
234 McMillan, J. (1993) ‘Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic Theory And GATT’s 
Article XXIV’, in Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading 
System, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 300. 
235 WTR 07, p. 320. 
236 Srinivasan , p. 345. 
 103
there is no reason for countries to permit the loss their bargaining chips. Second, the 
obligatory reduction of post-agreement barriers lowers countries’ incentives to conclude 
an agreement, and (because) it lowers welfare at least for some potential members and 
erodes potential gains from integration. For these reasons, it is unlikely that any 
proposal in this direction could become politically agreeable. Moreover, there are also 
serious implementation problems of such proposals. The McMillan proposal can hardly 
be realistically implemented due to the dynamic of preferential trade agreement 
proliferation as countries respond to a new preferential trade agreement by concluding 
another one, thus making an accurate long-term observation of trade volume difficult if 
not infeasible. The problem is more acute in case of free-trade areas where no common 
external barriers exist and any adjustment has to be done individually. 
 
4. Article XXIV: 6 (compensatory adjustment) 
 
Rationale 
 
 As lex specialis to Article XXIV: 5(a), Article XXIV: 6 and its respective 
provisions in the Understanding regulate compensation negotiations only in event of a 
customs union formation, and thereby relying on the negotiation procedure set forth in 
the GATT Article XXVIII. The formation of a customs union usually brings about the 
situation in which for some goods the pre-negotiation new customs union barriers 
between other WTO members and certain future members of the union are higher than 
before the formation due to the harmonization of external barriers. Other future 
members of the union shall offer a reduction of the new customs union barriers in the 
same goods, so as to comply with Article XXIV: 5(a). For example, in the case of an 
ascension to an existing customs union, economically and legally creating a new 
customs union, it is probable that for some commodities, the trade barrier between third 
countries and the ascending member(s), is higher than before the formation, as the 
external barriers of the ascending countries are increased to match those of the existing 
custom unions. That is a clear violation of Article XXIV: 5(a). The members of the 
former union shall reduce the existing trade barriers in the same goods as compensation. 
Should no satisfactory compensation be reached, the new customs can offer as 
compensation reduction of barriers with respect to trade in other goods. If this is not 
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achieved, affected non-members can withdraw equivalent concessions between them 
and the customs union members.237 To summarize, Article XXIV: 6 and its relevant 
part of the Understanding allow for three stages of negotiations. The first stage is the 
negotiations in order to comply with Article XXIV: 5(a). The second stage deals with 
the negotiations for compensation through barrier reduction in other goods. The third 
stage deals with the negotiations for compensation through concession withdrawal. 
 
 The rationale for the provision is based on the possibility of the efficient breach 
of Article XXIV: 5(a). A customs union that complies with all other provisions of the 
Article, including Article XXIV: 8, is believed to increase global aggregate welfare, 
even if it might violate Article XXIV: 5(a) by setting higher external trade barriers after 
its formation. Such a customs union thus satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria. 
Since it is globally more beneficial to allow such a customs union than ruling it out for 
the violation, there must be a provision such as Article XXIV: 6 in place in order to 
provide compensations for those negatively affected by the violation. In other words, 
the expected global welfare gains from such a customs union are larger than the 
compensation adjustment and the costs of negotiations for the compensation. Article 
XXIV: 6 can be considered as an invitation to commit an efficient breach of Article 
XXIV: 5(a).238 Moreover, the sequence of negotiation stages reflects the Article 
intention to prioritize compensation adjustments that lead to further multilateral 
liberalisation (the first and second stage adjustments reduce trade barriers not only 
between negotiation partners, but thanks to the MFN also to other WTO members) over 
adjustments that in fact reverse multilateral liberalisation process (withdrawal of 
existing concessions). 
 
Weakness and possible improvement 
 
 The weakness of the Article XXIV: 6 originates from the fact even if a customs 
union passes Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the Article fails arrange compensation so as to 
ultimately reach Pareto efficient outcome, thus leaving some non-members worse off 
than before. The Article is susceptible to reaching not only inefficient outcome but also 
weakening of the multilateral liberalisation process.  
                                                 
237 Paragraphs 4-6 of the Understandings. 
238 Schwartz and Sykes 1996, p. 73. 
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First, since the compensation adjustment in the first and second negotiation stage 
take a form of MFN concession from which also non-affected non-member countries 
profit without any equivalent reciprocal concession (free-rider problem), the customs 
union members have less incentive to seriously engage in the process. If the loss from 
the third-stage-negotiation concession withdrawal by affected trade partners is smaller 
than benefit that would be forgone by customs union’s concession withdrawal, they 
have incentives not to offer compensation but rather wait for the partner to withdraw 
concession, thus reversing the progress toward global free trade. 
 
Second, even the third stage might not lead to an equivalent concession at all. 
This is especially the case between a large customs union and small countries. Since the 
expected concession withdrawal is relatively small, the third stage is easily reached and 
small countries might ultimately find an equivalent tariff concession withdrawal could 
increase the import price such that the whole economic is gravely affected, and 
therefore refrain from taking such a step, and choose to accept at least some loss. 
Knowing this, the customs union might have incentive to set high external trade 
barriers, possibly with trade diversion effects.  
 
Third, as consequence, countries have incentives to organize themselves in 
customs union to increase bargaining power and the others’ price for violation of Article 
XXIV: 5(a), leading to fragmentation of the world trade regime (stumbling bloc). 
 
 Possible rule improvement should include imposing additional costs on moving 
from the second to the third step in order to ensure that compensatory adjustments are 
constructive for multilateral trade regime and reduce customs union incentives to take 
liberty of introducing excessively trade-diverting without having to fear concession 
withdrawal. This is a far-ranging step that might dispel countries willingness to 
transform free-trade areas in customs unions which are economically superior to the 
former given the existing rules. The Doha Negotiation Group on Rules did not so far 
include the improvement of this rule in its work programme.239
 
                                                 
239 Note 229 
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5. Article XXIV: 7 (notification, complaints and review 
procedure) 
 
Rationale 
 
 Article XXIV: 7 and the corresponding paragraphs 7-11 of the Understanding 
arrange for procedures for notification, complaint and review of preferential trade 
agreements, thus representing the first step of the application of the GATT Article 
XXIV. During these processes, all WTO members are able to exercise control over 
preferential trade agreements by evaluating their rule compliance, solving their possible 
incompatibility with the WTO agreements and eventually adopting decisions for their 
corresponding modification. As discussed earlier, the provisions in these regards do not 
oblige to start the procedures before the formation of a preferential trade agreement. Ex 
post notification, complaint and review procedures are common. Under the existing 
rules, WTO members, organized in the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) have an extensive opportunity to engage in these processes and to obtain and 
exchange relevant information from states members to preferential trade agreements and 
from the WTO secretariat, which plays an important role in analysing the issues at hand. 
At the end of each process, the final decision as to whether or not to exercise control by 
adopting a binding decision, recommendation or report is incumbent upon the Council 
for Trade in Goods (CTG).  
  
 The rationale of the provisions is not only to ensure the WTO compatibility of 
preferential trade agreements by rendering other provisions of the Article operational 
and by setting a framework for their application. More importantly they also play a role 
in reducing transaction costs that arise from trade in the situation in which preferential 
trade agreements coexist with the WTO trade regime. The sources of these costs 
originate from, first, legal uncertainty, relating to the choice-of-law and choice-of-legal-
forum problems or conflicting jurisprudence of preferential trade agreement dispute 
settlement bodies and those of the WTO, and, second, non-transparency and complexity 
of different legal regimes, which both increase costs of information gathering and 
evaluating, administration and monitoring.  
 
Although the provision deals with the application and enforcement aspect of the 
rules, it must be noted that neither this Article XXIV: 7 and its corresponding 
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paragraphs in the Understanding nor other provisions in the whole Article XXIV 
counteract all aspects of rule application and enforcement. It does not deal with the first 
source of transaction costs.  The Article does not prescribe or restrict a priori provisions 
in preferential trade agreements concerning their dispute settlement procedure, and 
concerning their choice of law and forum. Concerning the rule application and 
enforcement by the WTO, the WTO dispute settlement bodies takes only WTO law into 
consideration and any claim based on WTO law is the exclusive jurisdiction of 
DSB.240 Since there is no prohibition of the WTO rules being applied by preferential 
trade agreement dispute settlement bodies, these can take WTO law into consideration 
even if the claim is based the agreement as the case may be. Generally, they can also 
can verdict rulings conflicting with WTO provisions and rulings. The ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
problematic is not completely solved by the Article nor by the DSU.241
 
In contrast, the provision has been designed to reduce the transaction costs from 
the second source, thus contributing to upholding transparency, which is one of the 
fundamental principles of the WTO. In the processes leading to the final adaptation of 
decisions, recommendations or reports by the CTG, the WTO non-members of a 
preferential trade agreement are provided with information about the agreement and are 
able to seek more information from and to engage in a profound discussion with the 
members of the agreement which is subject to detailed scrutiny. The WTO Secretariat 
with its expertise undertakes the task of disseminating, gathering and evaluating 
information. Based on the discussions between the WTO members in the CTRA, it also 
assume the task of making report for the final sanction by the CTG. The whole 
processes take place within the CTRA and the CTG with a well-established procedure. 
 
Weakness and improvement under discussion 
 
 Although the provision is able to reduce transaction costs, it fails to fulfil its 
main tasks of rendering the whole Article operative and ensuring the WTO-
compatibility of preferential trade agreements. Therefore, their effective control is 
hardly possible. Its main weakness lies in the fact that first, the Article contains little 
incentives for compliance, since there is no provision that expressly makes notification 
                                                 
240 Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
241 Trachtman, pp. 21-2. 
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or review process obligatory or regular or allows for sanction for incompliance with the 
rules. Second, even if a notification, review or complaint process has been launched and 
the WTO Secretariat has submitted an outcome report to the CTG, the adaptation by 
consensus prevents any decision from being made. Bearing no results, consequently, 
countries ignore these processes and regard them as optional, and, in case of trade 
disputes, often refer to the WTO dispute settlement bodies rather than to complaint 
procedure, even if the costs of law determination at the DSB are potentially higher. 
 
 Suggestions on the rule improvement are based on the belief that they will result 
in an effective rule application by the mechanisms provided for in the Article XXIV: 7 
that is more efficient than its application and enforcement through the DSB. These 
suggestions include a proposal to strengthen review procedure by prescribing an 
obligatory periodical review of notified preferential trade agreements for every two 
years.242 More radically, the consensus rule can be change so that with a sufficient of 
like minded countries, a report of the WTO Secretariat can be adopted by the CTG. This 
proposal is, however, less likely to be politically agreeable and welfare-enhancing in the 
eyes of states, who, facing a risk of politically-motivated and less economically or 
legally-based decision making compared with those of the DSB, are forced to engage in 
costly political lobbying and coalition building, which could generally undermine the 
upholding of WTO rules.  More realistically, under the circumstances that the strength 
of the Article lies in the process (and less in the concrete outcome in form of adaptation 
of a binding document), Baldwin (2006) believed that the WTO Secretariat can enhance 
its role in the process by providing not only routine rule-compliance analysis of 
preferential trade agreements based on the inquiries in the CRTA but also analytical 
work to give member states a deeper understanding of measure possibly contained in 
the preferential trade agreement in question and of the risk it poses on global welfare 
and the WTO trade regime. By providing qualified information on these issues critical 
to the objectives of the WTO, it can alert members about the negative effects of 
preferential trade agreements beyond general assessment based on legal provisions.243 
In accordance with the Baldwin and the first proposal, the Doha Negotiation Group on 
Rules has been able to agree on a draft concerning the improvement of the provision in 
June 2006. This draft agreement, though not yet in force, mandate the WTO Secretariat 
                                                 
242 Srinivasan, p. 346-7. 
243 WTR 07, p. 320; Baldwin 2006. 
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to prepare a regular report on notified preferential trade agreements and thereby focus 
on the measures that adversely affected non-members, in order to induce countries 
entering preferential trade agreements to increasingly adopt WTO-compatible rules. 
Moreover, the draft agreement specifies what must be contained in a notification, 
defines in a more precise manner the procedure within the CRTA and provides for 
technical assistance for developing countries.244 The draft agreement is the most 
concrete rule improvement proposal in connection with the GATT Article XXIV to 
date. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 The preceding paragraphs show that Article XXIV contains legal provisions that 
regulate state behaviours regarding the formation of a free-trade area or a customs 
union. With the regulation in place, the design of preferential trade agreements should 
ensure that they increase global welfare and thereby not affecting any WTO member 
adversely, by limiting incidence that gives rise to trade diversion, encouraging the effect 
of trade creation, providing for compensations for members suffering from their 
formation, and reducing transaction costs. Therefore, the existence of the rule increase 
global welfare compared with the world without it. Nevertheless, the Article does not 
address all sources of inefficiencies created by preferential trade agreements. Its 
provisions contain some significant weaknesses especially concerning the rule 
application and enforcement as well as unclear language that have become a source of 
difficulties in rules application. 
 
 Similar to any other institution, the Article is subjected to enhancements, 
modifications and interpretations. At the time when it was agreed upon by the 23 GATT 
founding members in 1947, most of the economic effects of preferential trade 
agreements on the WTO regime had been unknown and their observed proliferation was 
then not expected, their effects were therefore underestimated or neglected. Since then 
the rule has been applied, and, notably, enhanced by the Understanding. Although the 
Doha Round includes the strengthening of the Article as one of its agendas, the 
improvement or further development through rule negotiations are not expected in the 
                                                 
244 Negotiating Group on Rules of the World Trade Organisation (2009), Transparency Mechanisms for 
Regional Trade Agreements, JOB(06)/59/Rev.5, adopted on 29 June 2009; WTR 07, p. 319. 
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very near future, since, apart from the remarkable progress made on Article XXIV:7, the 
discussion has been carried on without concrete text-based proposal from any member 
country since 2005.245
                                                 
245 Negotiating Group on Rules of the World Trade Organisation, Report by the Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiation Committee on 17 December 2008, TN/RL/23, dated  9 January 2009. 
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I. Conclusion 
 
 The preceding sections have demonstrated a possibility of law and economics 
being applied in public international law by providing an economic analysis of the 
GATT Article XXIV which regulates and enhances WTO-comformity of preferential 
trade agreements. Despite some criticisms of law and economics regarding the problem 
of identifiability, commensurability and inter-personal comparison of utility and the 
rejection of its methodological philosophy of utilitarianism by law scholars, and despite 
the main characteristics of public international law which further pose constraints to its 
application, such as its horizonal and decentralized law-making, enforcement and 
determination, and the sovereign nature of states as its primary subjects, the 
international community show significant analogies to domestic market, where law and 
economics has been extensively applied. These structural analogies can be observed, 
since states are regarded as rationally acting, self-interested and welfare-maximizing 
actors in the ‘international market’ in which the traded assets are powers (jurisdictions 
or rights to act) and the ‘international market’ of power is governed by institution, 
public international law. In the context of the Article XXIV, the provisions in the 
Article regulate states’ power to act in international trade matters regarding preferential 
trade agreements. Although the potential of law and economics in the field of public 
international law is present, specific characteristics of international law and the 
numerous actors in the international community with their diverse interests, in many 
cases unquantilifiable and endowments mean a comprehensive and quantitative analysis 
becomes impracticable. It also means that approaches in different disciplins of 
economics, international relations, and legal studies may be useful in capturing going 
political and legal elements beyond monetizable economic elements. 
 
Accordingly, the economic analysis of the Article aims at verifying its 
efficiency-enhancing role for the WTO trade community, focusing on the identification 
of sources of inefficiencies incurred to the multilateral system by preferential trade 
agreements, and on the question whether the rule interpretation and application correct 
the inefficiencies. In order to do so, the elements that constitute state welfare in the 
WTO context and the sources of transaction costs are that give rise to this trade 
institution have to be identified. Drawing on also non-economic disciplines, these 
elements are, for instance, national income expressed in exports and foreign investment, 
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terms-of-trade improvement, production efficiency, political security, whereas 
uncertainty about trade policy of trade partners, legal uncertainty, negotiation costs, 
trade rules enforcement costs are some examples of transaction costs in the WTO 
context. The presence of preferential trade agreements within the WTO trade regimes 
changes states’ welfare by affecting these elements. They increase legal uncertainty in 
application, interpretation and adjudication of a complex web of legal obligations, 
undermines transparency of world trading regime and create administrative and 
monitoring costs. More significantly they lead to trade creation and trade diversion 
effects, which have profound welfare impact on the WTO system. A preferential trade 
agreement does not always increase global welfare. And in case it does, it may do so at 
the costs of some other non-members. The welfare-reducing effects are usually closely 
linked to trade diversion, defined as the substitution of import from globally efficient 
producer in non-member countries by globally inefficient but now preferentially treated 
producer in the agreement area. Trade diversion does not only lead to welfare reduction 
in short-term, it is also associated with the breaking up of the WTO regime. The 
‘stumbling bloc’ character of trade-diverting preferential trade agreements leads to 
inefficiencies due to the fragmentation of world trade and high transaction costs, and 
prevent the trading community from attaining non-discriminatory global free trade. In 
contrast to trade diversion, trade creation is associated with welfare increase and being 
‘building bloc’, thus complementary, to WTO multilateral trade liberalisation. 
  
How much a preferential trade agreement is trade-creating or trade-diverting 
depends on its feature. For example, preferential trade agreements that liberalise all 
trade are more trade-creating than those maintaining some intra-agreement trade 
barriers. Liberalisation of competitive sectors tends to lead to trade creation, while 
liberalisation aimed at import substitution tends to be trade-diverting. The choice of 
external barriers of a preferential trade agreement determines the incidence of trade 
creation/diversion. Since the feature of a preferential trade agreement is a common trade 
policy choice of its members, the Article must sought to influence and regulatre the 
choice. 
 
 Article XXIV contains provisions that have the potential to effectively limit 
trade diversion, increase trade creation and reduce preferential-trade-agreement-induced 
transaction costs. Article XXIV: 8 increases trade creation by requiring that 
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substantially all trade, including non-tariff trade barriers, within the agreement area be 
liberalised. However, its unclear interpretation of the terms ‘substantially all’ and ‘other 
retrictive regulations, impairs potential trade creation effects. Article XXIV: 5 prohibits 
a preferential trade agreement from imposing higher trade barriers upon its formation in 
order to make sure that non-members are not adversely affected, and sets a timeframe 
for its realisation. Still, it has been critised for the calculation method of the benchmark 
with which new external barriers are compared as being insufficient in preventing third 
parties from welfare loss. Article XXIV: 6 provides for compensatory adjustments for 
negatively affected non-members, in order to ensure that no WTO member would suffer 
from a possible preferential trade agreement. But this provision, too, in many cases fail 
to lead to adequate compensation. Article XXIV: 7 plays an important role in reducing 
the transaction costs by setting up notification, review and complaint procedure. It is 
aimed to allow for an effective monitoring, regulating and examining the WTO-
compatibility of preferential trade agreements according to the Article. The fact that this 
effective control has never been and will probably no be exercised, the rule enforcement 
task is done by the WTO dispute settlement bodies. Although, its provisions contain 
some significant weaknesses especially concerning the rule application and enforcement 
as well as unclear language that have become a source of difficulties in rules 
application, and although the article cannot effectively make existence of preferential 
trade agreements in the WTO multilateral system beneficial for all, the existence of the 
rule increase global welfare compared with the world without it. At this stage, it also 
has to be noted that even if those detrimental effects are often associated with trade 
diversion and increased transaction costs of international trade, there exist other 
channels that cannot be captured and analysed in this thesis, through which preferential 
trade agreements impede the realisation of optimal global welfare. 
 
Considering the ongoing discussion about rule improvement, the current Doha 
negotiations include the Article into its work programm. Until this day, only little 
progress has been made. Even if weakness of the Article might suggest a great 
improvement potential, the Article as it stands is perhaps a political optimum, so that 
there is no sufficient political interest in changing it. At the same time, there is 
apparently no interest to apply it seriously either, even though the positive and negative 
effects of preferential trade agreements on the WTO trade regime cannot be denied. 
This is probably due to countries’ lack of resource and interest to push forward 
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multilateral trade agenda given the relative ease of negotiating a preferential trade 
agreement, which is their right countries are reluctant to constrain. Given the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements and their increasingly better known static 
and dynamic effects, it is not only possible for any future rule improvement to focus of 
these effects, it is necessary to take the economic consequences of different institutional 
framework into account and shift from a purely legal approach to a more comprehensive 
analysis, as Pascal Lamy stated that 
 
‘We need to look at the manner in which RTAs operate, and what 
effects they have on trade opening and on the creation of new 
economic opportunities. (…) I think it would be useful to look 
systematically at the characteristics and design of RTAs not only in 
terms of legal compliance questions, but also in terms of whether 
their architecture is more or less likely to foster multilateralization 
in the future.’ 
 
Pascal Lamy, September 10th, 2007.246
 
And clearly and desirably, law and economics has a great potential to play a 
significant role in this process. 
                                                 
246 Opening speech delivered at the Conference on ‘Multilateralising Regionalism’, Geneva, Switzerland, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl67_e.htm, retrieved on 1 January, 2010.  
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Appendix 
1. Zusammenfassung in Deutscher Sprache 
 
In heutugen internationalen Handelsbeziehungen, die zunehmend durch 
internationale Arbeitsteilung charakterisiert sind, nehmen die Handelsvolumen 
maßgeblich durch fortschreitende internationale Handelsliberalisierung 
überproportional zur Produktion zu. Dieser Prozess von Handelsliberalisierung bedeutet 
die Reduzierung oder gar Beseitigung von sowohl tariffären als auch nicht-tariffären 
Handelshemnissen, die in Form von international rechtlich verbindlichen Verträgen (im 
rechtsökonomischen Sinne ‚Institution’ sind) vereinbart ist. Die einzige universell 
anerkannte internationale Institution für Handelsregulierung und Handelsliberalisierung 
ist die Welthandelsorganisation (World Trade Organisation – WTO), deren Kern ihre 
Vorgängerinstitution, die General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), bildet. 
Neben der WTO existieren zahlreichen plurilaterale oder bilaterale Handelsabkommen 
zwischen fast allen WTO-Mitgliedstaaten (die sogenannten Regionale 
Handelsabkommen), die, betrachtet man die Handelsvolumen innerhalb ihrer 
Geltungsgebiet, Welthandel zunehmend dominieren. 
  
Die Koexistenz von der WTO als universelle Handelsregulierende Organisation 
und regionalen Handelsabkommen wirft eine Rechtsökonomische Frage bezüglich der 
Notwendigkeit und Sinnhaftigkeit von der Regulierung von regionalen 
Handelsabkommen durch die WTO. Denn die Mitglieder der regionalen Abkommen 
sind auch Mitglieder der WTO, und das Etablieren eines regionalen Handelsabkommens 
verletzt eines der zentralen Prinzipien der WTO, die Meisbegünstigungsklausel (Most 
Favoured Nation – MFN), da regionale Handelsabkommen bevorzugt einige Mitglieder 
der WTO Handelsgemeinschaft, nämlich diejenigen, die Mitglied der Abkommen sind, 
und schließen die anderen aus, deren Wohlfahrt laut internationaler Handelstheorien im 
Vergleich zur Situation vor der Etablierung abnehmen kann. Daraus resultiert, dass 
regionale Handelsabkommen die Gesamtwohlfahrt der WTO Handelsgemeinschaft 
reduziert. Als WTO Regulierungsmaßnahme von regionalen Handelsabkommen wurde 
das GATT Artikel XXIV etabliert mit dem Ziel, die regionalen Handelabkommen so zu 
gestalten, dass sie die Wohlfahrt ihrer Mitglieder steigern und zugleich sowohl die 
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Gesamtwohlfahrt der WTO Handelsgemeinschaft als auch die Wohlfahrt einzelner 
WTO Mitglieder, die nicht Mitglieder der Abkommen sind, nicht beeinträchtig wird. In 
anderen Worten versucht das Artikel regionale Handelsabkommen zu konfigurieren, 
dass sie für die WTO Handelsgemeinschaft eine Wohlfahrtverbesserung im Sinne von 
Kaldor-Hicks oder wenn möglich eine Pareto-Verbesserung bedeutet. 
 
Die Beantwortung der Frage, ob das Artikel dieses erwünsche Ziel erreicht, kann 
mithilfe Rechtsökonomischer Ansätze ermöglicht werden. Doch Rechtsökonomie wird 
nur im relativ begrenzten Ausmaß bei der Analyse von Rechtssystem bzw. 
Rechtsnormen im internationalen Kontext angewandt, vor allem im Bereich des 
Völkerrechts (public international law), bei dem Staaten nach wie vor die 
Hauptakteuren sind. Dennoch gibt es Anwendungspotenzial für Rechtsökonomie im 
Bereich des Wirtschaftsvölkerrechts. Betrachtet man den Staaten als rationales 
Individuen, die sich auf internationalem Markt die Güter, die Macht beispielsweise in 
Form von rechtlicher Zuständigkeit, vom Kompetenzbereich oder Handlungsrechte,  
handeln, und sich die Institution, das Völkerrecht, untergeordnet sind. Obwohl das 
Soveränitätsprinzip und das Fehlen von zentralen Rechtsschaffungs-, 
Rechtdurchsetzungs- und Rechtssprechungsorganen die Möglichkeit der Anwendung 
von Rechtsökonomie in dem Gebiet erheblich einschränkt, kann man gerade im Falle 
des GATT Artikel XXIV zeigen, dass die Anwendung möglich und sinnvoll ist. 
 
Weiters werden die unterschiedlichen Konfigurationen von regionalen 
Handelabkommen identifiziert, die die Handelsabkommen für die gesamte WTO 
Handelsgemeinschaft Wohlfahrt reduzierend wirken lassen. Diese treffen zu, 
beispielsweise wenn regionale Abkommen zumeist die Liberalisierung jener Güter 
beinhaltet, die die Mitgliedstaaten vor dem Inkrafttreten des Abkommens von 
Drittstaaten importiert wurden, die nun aber durch Begünstigung durch Produktion 
innerhalb des Geltungsgebiets der Abkommens ersetzt wird (sogenannte 
Handelsablenkung - trade diversion), oder wenn die Handelabkommen den Handel 
zwischen den Mitglieder nur unzureichend liberalisieren, oder weiterhin versteckte 
Handelshemmnisse erlauben. Folglich wird das Artikel überprüft in Hinblick auf die 
Vorgabe betreffend diese Konfigurationen und deren Umsetzung. Es wurde 
herausgefunden, dass sowohl die im Artikel vorgesehenen Regeln und Beschränkung 
der regionalen Handelsabkommen als auch deren Interpretation durch die WTO-
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Gerichtsbarkeit die Gesamtwohlfahrt aller WTO Mitglieder erhöhen kann im Vergleich 
mit der Situation ohne sie. Allerdings behindern die im Artikel und in relevanten WTO 
Verträgen vorgesehenen Umsetzungmechanismen eine wirksame Umsetzung des 
Artikel. 
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